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At the Whim of the Sovereign:
Aboriginal Title Reconsidered
By NELL JESSUP NEWTON*
In 1947, Professor Felix Cohen, then Associate Solicitor for the
United States Department of the Interior and a recognized scholar in
American Indian law, wrote that despite what "[e]very American
schoolboy is taught . . . the historic fact is that practically all of the
real estate acquired by the United States since 1776 was purchased not
from Napoleon or any other emperor or czar but from its original In-
dian owners."' Only eight years later, Justice Reed, writing for the ma-
jority of the United States Supreme Court in Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v.
United States,2 asserted a ontrary view: "Every American schoolboy
knows that the savage tribes of this continent were deprived of their
ancestral ranges by force and that, even when the Indians ceded mil-
lions of acres by treaty. . . it was not a sale but the conquerors' will
that deprived them of their land."'3
Professor Cohen's and Justice Reed's statements do not represent
merely an insignificant difference of opinion on an historic fact. To the
contrary, Justice Reed's historical observation was a predicate to the
Supreme Court's holding in Tee-Hit-Ton, one of the most significant
statements by the Court on the constitutional rights of Native Ameri-
cans to their aboriginal land, often defined as land upon which a tribe
has lived since "time immemorial. ' 4 Relying on his own historical ob-
* Assistant Professor of Law, The Catholic University of America, Columbus School
of Law. B.A., 1973, University of California, Berkeley; J.D., 1976, University of California,
Hastings College of the Law. Member, California & District of Columbia Bars. The author
gratefully acknowledges the research done in preparation of this Article by L. Carlisle, H.
Conte, D. Mayer, and A. Tharaldson.
1. Cohen, Or'iginalIndian Tile,-32 MINN. L. REv. 28, 34-35 (1947) [hereinafter cited
as Cohen].
2. 348 U.S. 272 (1955).
3. Id. at 289-90.
4. See, e.g., Oneida Indian Nation v. County of Oneida, 414 U.S. 661, 664 (1974);
Holden v. Joy, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 211,244 (1872); Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515,
559 (1832). Cf. United States exrel. Hualpai Indians v. Santa Fe Pac. Ry., 314 U.S. 339, 345
(1941) ("definable territory occupied exclusively" by the tribe); Mitchel v. United States, 34
U.S. (9 Pet.) 711, 745 (1835) ("perpetual right of possession. . . as their common property,
from generation to generation").
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servation and on questionable legal precedent, Justice Reed held in
Tee-Hit-Ton that the Indians' title rights,5 while permitting them to oc-
cupy their aboriginal land, did not represent a property right whose
extinguishment required compensation under the fifth amendment tak-
ing clause.6
The Tee-Hit-Ton opinion has stood for twenty-five years without
serious scrutiny. Several reasons, however, compel its reexamination.
First, because Tee-Hit-Ton implicitly authorizes congressional confis-
cation of Indian land, including reservation land created by executive
order7 or reserved by treaty,8 the decision continues to threaten many
Native Americans. Second, because the case acknowledges a congres-
sional power to extinguish Indian rights to tribal land, fear of congres-
sional reprisals prevents many tribes from fully litigating existing
claims against the government. 9 Finally, and most significantly, Tee-
5. This Article uses the terms "aboriginal title" and "recognized title" when describ-
ing post- Tee-Hit-Ton cases. Because the term "recognized title" did not exist before Tee-
Hit-Ton, see text accompanying notes 110-83 infra, these terms are used in regard to pre-
Tee-Hit-Ton cases only when it can be determined that a modem court, applying Tee-Hit-
Ton, would conclude that the tribe held either aboriginal or recognized title. Generally, this
determination can not be made, especially when the tribe had a treaty. In such cases, the
generic term "Indian title" is used to denote that, under the Tee-Hit-Ton test, the land tenure
may be either aboriginal or recognized.
6. 348 U.S. at 288-89.
7. See text accompanying notes 236-250 infra.
8. See text accompanying notes 251-75 infra.
9. Admittedly, Indian tribes have made some major gains in the federal courts. For
example, they have forced the government to invest their trust funds instead of letting the
money sit in the Treasury as an interest free loan to the federal government. Cheyenne-
Arapaho Tribes v. United States, 512 F.2d 1390 (Ct. Cl. 1975); Mancester Band of Porno
Indians v. United States, 363 F. Supp. 1238 (N.D. Cal. 1973). Additionally, some Northwest
Coast tribes have been allotted 50% of the entire salmon catch of Puget Sound, based on
treaties signed in the 1850's. Washington v. Washington State Commercial Passenger Fish-
ing Vessel Ass'n, 443 U.S. 658 (1979). Nevertheless, because of recent Eastern land claims,
see, e.g., Oneida Indian Nation v. County of Oneida, 414 U.S. 661 (1974); Joint Tribal
Council of Passamaquoddy Tribe v. Morton, 528 F.2d 370 (1st Cir. 1975); and the fishing
claims in Washington, see, e.g., Washington v. Washington State Commercial Passenger
Fishing Vessel Ass'n., 443 U.S. 658 (1979), several members of Congress introduced bills to
overturn the recent decisions by authorizing extinguishment of all tribal ownership rights in
the disputed areas. See, e.g., H.R. 9951, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 123 CONG. REC. 12242 (1977)
(to extinguish all aboriginal water rights and limit tribal water rights for Indian reservations
to present use); H.R. 9950, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 123 CONG. REC. 12242 (1977) (to waive
tribal government immunity and limit tribal jurisdiction); H.R. 9906, 95th Cong., 1st Sess.,
123 CONG. REC. 12099 (1977) (to extinguish tribal title and interests to lands or water in
New York); H.R. 9054, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 123 CONG. REC. 9304 (1977) (to abrogate all
treaties between Indian tribes and United States); S.J. Res. 86, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 123
CONG. REC. 16232 (1977) (to extinguish any right, title, or other interest of the Mashpee
tribe to certain lands in Massachusetts). None of the "backlash" bills were passed. The
relationship between the assertion of Indian rights and congressional attempts to extinguish
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Hit-Ton provides a rule of law that, if unchecked, may be used to jus-
tify other arbitrary congressional action in derogation of Indian tribal
rights.
This Article argues that the Tee-Hit-Ton case represents unsound
legal reasoning. More important, the Article proposes that because the
case presents significant dangers to Indian rights and to future Indian
claims, the decision must be reevaluated. The first section of the Arti-
cle explores the history and foundation of the Tee-Hit-Ton decision,
critically analyzes the rationale employed by the Court, and concludes
with speculations on the motivation behind the Court's holding. The
second section of the Article discusses Tee-Hit-Ton's effect on current
litigation involving Indian claims. By addressing the substantive falla-
cies of the Court's rationale and the potential dangers of future applica-
tions of the case, the Article hopes to supply a sufficient basis for future
restriction of Tee-Hit-Ton's impact.
The Tee-Hit-Ton Rule
When the United States acquired Alaska from Russia in 1867,10
the new territory had few White settlers. Indigenous Alaskan Indian
tribes, such as the Esquimos, Aleuts, and Tlingits, were the sole occu-
pants of most of the territory. Because the Alaskan climate is so inhos-
pitable, many years passed without the clashes between Indians and
White settlers that had typified western expansion. Two factors, how-
ever, made conflict unavoidable. First, although Alaska comprises
365,000,000 acres, only a small percentage of that land is habitable.'
Second, Alaska is rich in natural resources, particularly oil.12 As the
potential value of Alaska's resources became known, and as Alaskans
began lobbying intensely for statehood, the Alaska natives' rights to
their aboriginal lands inevitably became an issue.
In 1947 Congress passed a joint resolution directing the Secretary
of the Interior to sell the right to cut timber from a forest located in
territory inhabited by Alaska tribes.'3 The joint resolution directed
these rights is obvious, especially to Indian leaders. Fear of this type of backlash may pre-
vent tribes from fully pressing or litigating their claims. Certainly, the knowledge that Con-
gress has the power to extinguish Indian rights has weakened the bargaining position of the
tribes who wish to settle their claims.
10. Treaty with Russia, March 30, 1867, United States-Russia, 15 Stat. 539, T.S. No.
301.
11. See The,41aska Lands Issue: Our Last Frontier, 33 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 671 (1977).
12. See generally FEDERAL FIELD COMMITTEE FOR DEVELOPMENT PLANNING IN
ALASKA, ALASKA NATIVES AND THE LAND 285-426 (1968).
13. H.R.J. Res. 205, 61 Stat. 920 (1947).
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that proceeds of the sale be put in a trust fund until the nature of the
Indians' "possessory rights" in the timber could be determined.' 4 In
addition, section 3(b) of the resolution stated: "Nothing in this resolu-
tion shall be construed as recognizing or denying the validity of any
claims of possessory rights to lands or timber within the exterior
boundaries of the Tongass National Forest."' 5 Once the merchantable
timber in the 350,000 acre forest had been cut down, the Tee-Hit-Ton
band of Tlingit Indians sued for a partial taking, basing their claim on
an earlier case that had held that aboriginal title included ownership of
standing timber.' 6 If the tribe held aboriginal title to the 350,000 acres
within the forest, and if that interest were protected by the fifth amend-
ment, the government could be compelled to compensate the tribe for
cutting down the timber.
Although the Supreme Court had decided many cases concerning
the rights flowing from aboriginal title, 7 the Court had rarely consid-
ered whether a tribe's aboriginal interest in land was protected from
confiscation by the government under the fifth amendment taking
clause. Congress had only recently waived sovereign immunity for
claims against the government occurring after 1946, by passing the In-
dian Claims Commission Act.' 8 That statute, which also created the
Indian Claims Commission and empowered it to adjudicate claims
arising before 1946,19 conferred jurisdiction on the Court of Claims to
adjudicate legal and equitable claims of the Indians. Accordingly, the
primary issue in Tee-Hit-Ton was whether aboriginal ownership con-
ferred any legal or equitable rights against the government cognizable
under this jurisdictional statute.
Justice Reed, writing for the majority in Tee-Hit-Ton, held that
aboriginal title was not a compensable property right unless Congress
had "recognized," by treaty or other unambiguous legislation, the
tribe's right to live on the land permanently. 20 Justice Reed reached
this conclusion by referring to a series of cases on sovereign rights to
Indian land, beginning with Johnson v. M'Intosh.2' According to the
14. Id. § 3(a).
15. Id. § 3(b).
16. See Shoshone Tribe v. United States, 299 U.S. 476 (1937).
17. See notes 32-106 & accompanying text infra.
18. Indian Claims Commission Act of 1946, ch. 959, 60 Stat. 1049 (codified at 25
U.S.C. §§ 70 to 70v-3 (1976 & Supp. 11 1978) (pre-1946 claims); 28 U.S.C. § 1505 (1976)
(post-1946 claims)).
19. Id.
20. 348 U.S. at 288-91.
21. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823).
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Court, Johnson stood for the proposition that by discovery of territory,
a sovereign gained the exclusive right to extinguish the native tribes'
title by purchase or conquest. 22 Apparently viewing the act of discov-
ery by the sovereign as itself extinguishing all Indian title to land, Jus-
tice Reed then reasoned that' aboriginal title represented a permission
by the sovereign to occupy, entailing nothing more than "mere posses-
sion not specifically recognized as ownership" of land.23 Congress, of
course, could choose to recognize the Indians' permanent right to oc-
cupy a territory, thus entitling the tribe to compensation for the extin-
guishment of that recognized right, but until such "recognized" title
was bestowed on the Indians, any interest they held did not require
compensation upon confiscation by the government. 24 Moreover, be-
cause the decision whether to recognize the Indians' right to land was
exclusively within the authority of Congress, the fa.lure of Congress to
recognize Indian title raised only political and not justiciable ques-
tions,25 thereby precluding judicial review.
Applying this theory to the facts in Tee-Hit-Ton, Justice Reed first
noted that Congress had never explicitly recognized the Tlingits' per-
manent right to occupy any portion of the forested area.26 Accordingly,
the Tlingits possessed merely aboriginal, and not recognized, title.27
Because Congress apparently had decided not to recognize the Tlingits'
permanent right to occupy the land in question, Justice Reed deter-
mined that Congress also apparently had chosen not to compensate the
Tlingits for the confiscation of their land.28 As possessors of nothing
more than aboriginal title, the Tlingits had no legal or equitable claim
cognizable under the jurisdictional statute, and their claim was dis-
missed.
Chief Justice Warren and Justices Douglas and Frankfurter dis-
sented. They did not, however, disagree with the rule that unrecog-
nized aboriginal title is not protected by the fifth amendment taking
clause. Instead, they argued the tribe held recognized title because the
Organic Act for Alaska of 188429 had recognized the Alaska natives'
22. 348 U.S. at 279-80.
23. Id. at 279.
24. Id. at 288-89.
25. Id. at 281 (citing United States ex rel. Hualpai Indians v. Santa Fe Pac. R.R., 314
U.S. 339, 347 (1941)).
26. 348 U.S. at 278.
27. See id. at 278-79.
28. Id. at 278-79, 288-89.
29. Ch. 53, 23 Stat. 24 (1884).
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right permanently to live on their land, thus entitling them to fifth
amendment protection. 30
Tee-Hit-Ton in Context: Genesis and Development of the
Doctrine of Discovery
Underlying Justice Reed's conclusion in Tee-Hit-Ton that a taking
of aboriginal title is not compensable under the fifth amendment was
the premise that aboriginal title is not a property right but a -"mere
possessory right" subject to the whim of the sovereign. Justice Reed
purported to derive this principle from those cases dealing with the
doctrine of discovery, a doctrine first applied to Indian title questions
by Chief Justice Marshall in "[t]he great case of Johnson v.
M'Intosh.' '3! Justice Reed's reliance on the doctrine of discovery was
misplaced because an analysis of the development of that doctrine, as
begun in the Marshall Court and as refined by subsequent cases lead-
ing up to Tee-Hit-Ton, supports the conclusion that aboriginal title is
indeed a compensable property right.
Genesis: The Marshall Court
The major doctrines of federal Indian law were established in a
series of opinions by the Marshall Court.32 Four of these cases played
a prominent role in the Court's development of the doctrine of discov-
ery. 3 3
The earliest Marshall Court case involving Indian land claims was
the Yazoo land case, Fletcher v. Peck.34 A purchaser who traced his
30. 348 U.S. at 294.
31. Id. at 279.
32. See Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832) (tribal sovereignty); Cherokee
Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831) (trust relationship); Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S.
(8 Wheat.) 543 (1823) (doctrine of discovery).
Because they view themselves as sovereigns, some Indian tribes assert that Indian law
properly is the study of tribal law only. Thus, some Indians, especially traditional tribal
members, to this day do not acknowledge the sovereignty of the United States over them.
See, e.g., Letter from Representatives of the Iroquois Confederacy to Raporteur Martinez
Cobo of the Subcommission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities
of the Commission on Human Rights of the United Nations Economic and Social Council,
(July 26, 1976), reprinted in AM. INDIAN J., Sept. 1976, at 5; Letter from the Lakota Treaty
Council, AM. INDIAN J., Sept. 1976, at 8; Internation NGO Conference on Discrimination
Against Indigenous Populations in the Americas-1977, AM. INDIAN J., Nov. 1977, at 12-13,
23. This Article concedes that Indian nations are subject to the laws of the United States,
however, and hence is limited to an analysis of federal Indian law.
33. See Mitchel v. United States, 34 U.S. (9 Pet.) 711 (1835); Worcester v. Georgia, 31
U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832); Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823); Fletcher v.
Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810).
34. 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810). Fletcher is best known as the first Supreme Court
interpretation of the contract clause. The case grew out of a land fraud scheme involving the
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title back to a grant of aboriginal lands by Georgia sued for a breach of
covenants in his deed. Indian title was in issue only tangentially be-
cause one of the covenants represented that Georgia was seised in fee at
the time of the grant.35 Thus, the Court had to resolve whether Geor-
gia had the power to grant land occupied by the Indians. The Court
held that, as one of the original thirteen states, Georgia could grant the
land: "The majority of the court is of opinion that the nature of Indian
title, which is certainly to be respected by all courts, until it be legiti-
mately extinguished, is not such as to be absolutely repugnant to seisin
in fee on the part of the state."' 36 letcher thus established the proposi-
tion that the sovereign has the authority to grant land held in Indian
title.37 The opinion failed to delineate, however, the rights, if any, at-
taching to Indian title, including the effect of the grant on Indian title.
The Court merely indicated that Indian title was to be respected until it
was extinguished and that the Indians living on granted land could not
be ejected by a grantee of the state.3 8
Justice Johnson dissented, criticizing the majority's failure to ex-
plain or characterize the nature of the Indians' property interest. In
Justice Johnson's view, the state could not have a fee simple estate be-
cause its interest was "a mere possibility," 39 while the Indians had the
"absolute proprietorship of their soil.' '4o This approach, although per-
haps legally sound, presented an obstacle the Court neither needed, nor
desired, to confront in Fletcher: if the Indians' interest in their aborigi-
nal land was that of an absolute proprietor, all the grants of aboriginal
lands to private persons solely by the United States government would
be void. Such a decision would have had far-reaching effects, since
these grants formed the basis of most claims to real property in the
United States.
Thirteen years later Johnson v. M'Intosh4' forced the Court to an-
swer the difficult questions it had avoided in Fletcher. As with many
Indian land questions, Johnson arose from a dispute between non-In-
bribery of all but one member of the Georgia legislature. The validity of titles to a large
area of land in present-day Alabama and Mississippi turned on its outcome. For a history of
this case, see C. HAINES, THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN GOVERNMENT
AND POLITICS 309-23 (1944) [hereinafter cited as HAINES].
35. 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) at 139-40.
36. Id. at 142-43.
37. Id. at 142. See Oneida Indian Nation v. County of Oneida, 414 U.S. 661, 670
(1974).
38. 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) at 142-43.
39. Id. at 146.
40. Id.
41. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823).
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dian successors to the original grantees of Indian land. The case turned
on the narrow issue of whether grants of land in 1773 and 1775 by the
Illinois and Piankeshaw nations to a private individual superseded a
later sale by the same tribes to the United States government. Conse-
quently, the Court squarely faced the task of reconciling the rights of
the government and the Indians to alienate land.
In reconciling the competing rights of the United States govern-
ment and the Native Americans, Chief Justice Marshall based his deci-
sion in Johnson on the principle that a nation discovering and taking
possession of new territory acquires certain rights in the territory, stat-
ing "[D]iscovery gave title to the government by whose subjects, or by
whose authority, it was made, against all other European governments,
which title might be consummated by possession. ' 42
Chief Justice Marshall then proceeded to delineate the rights of
each party. Discovery of a new territory gave the discoverer the exclu-
sive right as sovereign to acquire Indian land and thereby to extinguish
Indian title.43 The discoverer's mere acquisition of this right upon dis-
covery did not, however, extinguish all Indian rights to the territory.
To the contrary, until the discoverer exercised its right, either "by
purchase or by conquest" 44 the Indians were recognized as "the rightful
occupants of the soil, with a legal as well as just claim to retain posses-
sion of it. '' 45 Consequently, until the discoverer exercised its exclusive
right, both the sovereign and the Indians had simultaneous interests in
the territory. After Indian title was extinguished, however, the sover-
eign gained an "absolute title," 46 unrestricted by Indian rights.
Applying this doctrine to the facts in Johnson, the Chief Justice
concluded that the original sale by the Indians conveyed at most only
the same right to occupy that the tribe possessed.47 Since the doctrine
42. Id. at 573. As Chief Justice Marshall pointed out, possession was necessary be-
cause discovery alone could not support the original extravagant claims of the discovering
nations; the discoverer had to exercise physical control over the claimed land. For example,
England's charter to its first colony granted 400 miles north and south along the eastern
seacoast, extending from sea to sea. Id. at 577-78. Actual possession, however, often accom-
plished only at the expense of a war, was necessary to perfect these claims. Id. at 579-84.
See Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 544 (1832).
43. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 587.
44. Id. It was necessary to establish that only the discoverer had the right to purchase;
otherwise a competing nation could buy the land out from under the discoverer, thereby
destroying the discoverer's land base and its claim to sovereignty.
45. Id. at 574 (emphasis added).
46. See id. at 588.
47. Id. at 593.
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of discovery permitted the sovereign alone to extinguish Indian title,48
this earlier sale was without legal significance, thereby rendering the
subsequent sale to the United States valid.49 As a consequence, the
holder of the United States patent prevailed.50
Notably, there were two alternative, although unacceptable, meth-
ods Chief Justice Marshall could have used to resolve Johnson without
resort to the doctrine of discovery. On one hand, he could have relied
on the traditional legal maxim, nemo dat quod non habet (no one gives
what he does not have), to conclude that because the Indian tribes had
no cognizable right to their lands, the original sale was void. On the
other hand, if he concluded the Indians' rights to their land were abso-
lute, as Justice Johnson had suggested in Fletcher, he would invalidate
the government grants of land occupied by Indian tribes, which formed
the basis of most claims to real property in this country.51 As Professor
Cohen has pointed out, the doctrine protected Indian rights to their
aboriginal land without invalidating the government grants to which so
many Americans traced their title.52 As such, it represents a brilliant
compromise, providing the analytical framework to uphold the validity
of sovereign grants of aboriginal land while giving substance to Indian
or aboriginal title.5 3
The third major Marshall Court case to develop the doctrine of
discovery, Worcester v. Georgia,54 also discussed the validity of sover-
eign grants of aboriginal land, while further defining the scope of In-
48. Notably, the court recognized the coexistence of two land tenure systems: that of
the United States government and that of the Indians. Although under the doctrine of dis-
covery the private settler acquired no rights enforceable under the United States law by
purchasing land from the Indians, the Court stated that, were the tribe to annul the original
grant, the individual purchaser might be able to seek redress under tribal laws. Id. at 593.
49. Id. at 593-94.
50. Another view of Marshall's reason for not recognizing the claims of the private
grantee is that titles to land based on Indian grants could not be recognized in the courts of
the United States. See HAINES, supra note 34, at 524. See note 48 supra.
In dicta, Chief Justice Marshall discussed the effect of the discoverer's grants of aborigi-
nal lands on the Indian occupants, an issue Justice Johnson had criticized the court for
dodging in his dissent in Fletcher. As in Fletcher, Chief Justice Marshall again concluded
that the sovereign had the power to grant aboriginal land, although in Johnson the conclu-
sion was supported by a thorough examination of the practices of France, Spain, and Great
Britain. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 574-77. This examination revealed that "our whole country
[has] been granted by the Crown while in the occupation of the Indians." Id. at 579. Thus,
contrary to Justice Johnson's views, Chief Justice Marshall concluded that the doctrine of
discovery was "incompatible with an absolute and complete title in the Indians." Id. at 588.
51. See Cohen, supra note 1, at 48-49.
52. Id.
53. See id.
54. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832). See generally HAINES, supra note 34, at 600-04 (1944);
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dian land rights. The major issue in Worcester was whether Georgia
could exercise sovereignty over the Cherokee Nation. The discussion
of the discovery doctrine ostensibly was necessary to determine what
interest, if any, the Cherokee Nation had in its homeland in Georgia.
If the Cherokee Nation had no property interest, Georgia would have
exclusive sovereignty over the area in question. Georgia argued that
the Indians lost all property rights by virtue of discovery. Chief Justice
Marshall rejected this argument on several grounds. First, he noted
that the tribe still inhabited its aboriginal territory, thereby evidencing
the establishment of a land base over which it exercised sovereignty. 55
Second, the United States had dealt with the Cherokee Nation as a
limited sovereign nation, agreeing by treaty on the boundaries of the
tribe's land.5 6 Finally, the Court discussed for the first time the Indian
commerce clause,57 which entrusts to Congress the right to regulate af-
fairs with the Indian tribes.5 8 Because Congress had entered into a
treaty with the Cherokees, the Court concluded that Georgia was pre-
empted from interfering with the Cherokees' land tenure or rights to
self-government. 9
Worcester's prime importance derives not from its finding that the
Indians retained aboriginal rights, but from its qualification of the sov-
ereign's right to extinguish Indian title. Referring to the doctrine of
discovery, Chief Justice Marshall stated that a sovereign grant of In-
dian land, in and of itself, was not sufficient to extinguish Indian title.
To the contrary, until the sovereign extinguished Indian title, a grant
"asserted a title against Europeans only and [was] considered as blank
paper so far as the rights of the natives were concerned."' 60 Second, the
opinion clarified the statement in Johnson authorizing the sovereign's
extinguishment of Indian title by "conquest. ' '6t According to Chief
Burke, The Cherokee Cases.- A Study in Law, Politics, and Morality, 21 STAN. L. REV. 500
(1969).
55. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 559-60.
56. Id. at 555-56.
57. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3.
58. See 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 558-59.
59. Id. at 560-63. Worcester thus traditionally is cited as holding that Indian tribes
possess inherent sovereignty subordinate in certain limited areas only to the sovereignty of
the United States. See, e.g., United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 326, 331 (1978); Oli-
phant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 206-07. Accordingly, states may not exer-
cise jurisdiction over Indian tribes within their borders in the absence of a congressional
grant giving them the power to do so. See, e.g., Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 219-20
(1959).
60. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 546.
61. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 587.
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Justice Marshall, the power to extinguish Indian title by conquest was
justifiable only after a confrontation in which the Indians had been the
aggressors.62
The final major decision by the Marshall Court on Indian land
rights, Mitchel v. United States,63 presented the Court with an opportu-
nity to determine the rights of a tribe to alienate its interest in land.
Like Johnson, Mitchel concerned adverse claims by the holder of a
United States land patent and a party tracing title to a tribal grant.
Justice Baldwin first determined that the tribe's aboriginal title had not
been extinguished by Spain, the nation claiming discovery rights to
Florida during the pertinent period before the tribal grant.64 He then
noted that Spain acknowledged the Indians' interest in their aboriginal
land as one which they could convey to a third party.65 When the tribal
grant was confirmed by Spain, the grantee thus obtained a fee simple
title to the land.66 Since Spain's cession of the land to the United States
explicitly ratified all grants made by Spain prior to the cession, 67 the
holder of the ratified tribal grant had a title superior to that of the later
United States patent holder.68
Mitchel made clear that aboriginal title was alienable to third par-
ties if the sale were ratified by the sovereign. In establishing this fea-
ture of aboriginal title, the Court emphasized the significance to be
attached to the rights associated with aboriginal title69 and the defer-
ence the sovereign must afford such title.70 Reiterating language of
Cherokee Nation v. Georgia7' Justice Baldwin termed the right of occu-
pancy "as sacred as the fee simple of the Whites. ' 72 Furthermore,
under Justice Baldwin's analysis, discovery gave the sovereign only an
"ultimate reversion in fee,"' 73 subject to the tribe's "perpetual right of
occupancy." 74 Consequently, a successor to the land could acquire a
62. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 545-47.
63. 34 U.S. (9 Pet.) 711 (1835).
64. Id. at 751-56.
65. Id. at 758.
66. Id. at 758-59.
67. See id. at 734-35.
68. Id. at 759-60.
69. Id. at 752, 754, 756.
70. Id. at 758-59.
71. 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831).
72. 34 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 746 (citing Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 48
(1831) (Baldwin, J., concurring)).
73. 34 U.S. (9 Pet.) at 756.
74. d. at 746.
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fee simple absolute title only upon obtaining both the fee and the pos-
sessory right.
Evolution of the Doctrine of Discovery
Following the Marshall Court era, every court considering the
doctrine of discovery reaffirmed its basic tenets. Only a few of these
cases, those which rely on the Marshall Court's decisions and which
address unresolved issues related to the nature of Indian title, are suffi-
ciently significant for the present purpose to warrant comment. These
decisions address four major aspects of Indian land title: first, the sov-
ereign's power to extinguish Indian title; second, the concept of split
title; third, the methods available for extinguishing Indian title; and
fourth, rights for compensation under the fifth amendment taking
clause. Neither the Marshall Court decisions nor the refinements of the
doctrine of discovery in subsequent decisions support Justice Reed's
analysis in the 1955 Tee-Hit-Ton decision.
The doctrine of discovery did not change drastically after its origi-
nal promulgation by the Marshall court; however, several decisions did
refine aspects of the doctrine. The first area of refinement involved the
sovereign's preemptive power to extinguish Indian title. Although this
power had never been doubted, there was considerable uncertainty as
to whether Fletcher stood for the proposition that the original thirteen
states also had the right to extinguish Indian title. In 1974 the Supreme
Court answered this question, holding that the statement in Fletcher
that the original thirteen states were seised of the fee meant only that
they had the preemptive right to purchase. 75
The second area of refinement clarified the meaning of the Mitchel
decision. Since Mitchel, the Court has consistently described Indian
title as a split title, characterizing the sovereign's interest as ownership
of the fee and the tribe's interest as a right of occupancy.76 Accord-
75. Oneida Indian Nation v. County of Oneida, 414 U.S. 661, 670 (1974) (original 13
states owned the fee and thus the preemptive right to purchase, but could not extinguish
Indian title without federal consent).
76. See, e.g., Francis v. Francis, 203 U.S. 233, 238 (1906); Doe v. Wilson, 64 U.S. (23
How.) 457, 463 (1859) (tenancy in common); Clark v. Smith, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 195, 201
(1839). Butcf. United States v. Cook, 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 591, 593 (1873) (tribe as life tenant,
United States as remainderman). The necessity for tribal consent to convey absolute fee title
was reaffirmed in an 1853 decision. See Chouteau v. Molony, 57 U.S. (16 How.) 203 (1853).
In Chouteau the Court stated that a Spanish grant of aboriginal land of the Sac and Fox
tribes in what became the Louisiana purchase would have been invalid without tribal con-
sent. Id. at 239. Because the tribe had only given the claimant's predecessor a mining ease-
ment, the Court interpreted the sovereign grant as confirming only the rights given by the
tribe despite broad language in the grant which could be read as granting the fee. Id. at
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ingly, a grant by the government would be encumbered by aboriginal
title until the title was extinguished, a conclusion reached by the Mar-
shall era cases, although arguably only in dicta.77
The validity of a sovereign grant of aboriginal land has rarely
been raised since the Marshall era because many United States grants
on their faces protected Indian title, providing that the grantee could
not occupy the land until Indian title had been extinguished by Con-
gress.78 There are, however, a few cases raising the issue directly. In
Clark v. Smith, 79 for example, a patent to unextinguished aboriginal
land issued in 1795 was upheld over the objections of a rival claimant.
The Court held the patent valid, but only to convey the fee; the paten-
tee gained full title only when the aboriginal title of the Chickasaw
Indians was extinguished by a treaty.80 In the subsequent case of
Beecher v. Wetherby,8 ' involving a school land grant by the United
States to Wisconsin, the Court also held the grant valid only to convey
228-29. See Cohen, supra note 1, at 51. The necessity for sovereign consent to convey a fee
simple absolute title was embodied in the Nonintercourse Act, first enacted in 1834, Act of
June 30, 1834, ch. 161, § 12, 4 Stat. 729 (1834), and still in effect today. See 25 U.S.C. § 177
(1976). This law provides that all sales made without such consent are void. The current
version of the law is the basis of the claims by eastern tribes that sales of their aboriginal
land to the states made without federal consent were void. See notes 294-309 and accompa-
nying text infra.
77. This description of Indian title should be considered dicta because the validity of a
grant of aboriginal title was not directly at issue in many of these cases. In Fletcher and
Johnson, the sovereign grant was made after Indian title had been extinguished. In Worces-
ter no grants had been made of Cherokee land, although Georgia asserted the power to
extinguish Cherokee title. In Mitchel, the tribe's grant of its land had been confirmed later
by the sovereign and thus was valid to convey the fee simple absolute. Descriptions of title
as split in these cases therefore must be read as dicta. Nonetheless, the Court has stated that
dicta in early cases, especially early land cases, is extremely persuasive. United States ex rel.
Hualpai Indians v. Santa Fe Pac. R.R., 314 U.S. 339, 346 (1941).
78. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Hualpai Indians v. Santa Fe Pac. R.R., 314 U.S. 339,
344-45 (1941); Atlantic & Pac. R.R. v. Mingus, 165 U.S. 413, 437-38 (1897); Buttz v. North-
ern Pac. R.R., 119 U.S. 55, 58 (1886). Cf. Spalding v. Chandler, 160 U.S. 394, 402 (1896)
(Preemption Act of 1841 explicitly excepted Indian reservations from settlement).
In some instances the grants did not explicitly protect Indian title, but a sympathetic
Supreme Court, reading the language of the grant in light of the doctrine of discovery, inter-
preted the grant as manifesting a congressional intent that the grantee await extinguishment
before acquiring a right to the land. See, e.g., Cramer v. United States, 261 U.S. 219, 225
(1923) (railroad grant exception for land "granted, sold, reserved. . . or otherwise disposed
of' excepted aboriginal land inhabited by individual Indians); Minnesota v. Hitchcock, 185
U.S. 373, 391 (1902) (school land grant excepting lands "sold or otherwise disposed of'
excepted reservation lands of the Chippewa tribe); Leavenworth, Lawrence & Galveston
R.R. v. United States, 92 U.S. 733, 746 (1875) (railroad grant excepting land "reserved to the
United States. . . for any other purpose whatsoever" excepted reservation of Osage tribe).
79. 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 195 (1839).
80. Id. at 201.
81. 95 U.S. 517 (1877).
July 19801
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
irrevocably the "naked fee" to the grantee, so that the state received
full title only when Indian title was extinguished two years later. 82
The third major area addressed by the post-Marshall era courts
was the methods available to extinguish Indian title. Although John-
son formally established that the government could extinguish Indian
title "either by purchase or by conquest,183 never before Tee-Hit-Ton
did the Court hold that aboriginal land had been extinguished by con-
quest. In part this is a result of the congressional practice of waiving
sovereign immunity only rarely, thereby precluding judicial determina-
tions of Indians' rights against the sovereign. To a large extent, how-
ever, the lack of any findings of a conquest is attributable to the
practice employed by the federal government of negotiating treaties
even with defeated tribes, wherein the Indians ceded portions of their
land.8 4 Indeed, extinguishment by voluntary cession for consideration
had been the rule in acquisition of Indian title.85 Before Tee-Hit-Ton
virtually all cases finding Indian title extinguished involved voluntary
cession.86 The only exceptional cases were those in which the court
held that extinguishment had occurred by tribes voluntarily aban-
doning their occupancy rights,87 a method of extinguishment alluded to
in Johnson.88
Perhaps the most important area of judicial development in Indian
land claim disputes, however, focused on compensating Indians under
82. Id. at 525-26. In only one case involving the construction of a grant did the Court
hold that a sovereign grantee had obtained a fee simple title despite the fact that aboriginal
title had not been expressly extinguished by Congress. That case, Marsh v. Brooks, 55 U.S.
(14 How.) 513 (1852), is not inconsistent with the tenets of the doctrine of discovery, how-
ever. The grantee in Marsh had lived and made improvements on a plot of land for 50 years
without the tribe's objection. Although the grantee was never a formal purchaser of the
land, principles of fairness in all likelihood dictated the Court's holding. As the Court itself
noted, the tribe "must be held to knowledge [of] and to consent" to the grantee's claim,
particularly in view of "his open and notorious actual occupancy." Id. at 524. At most,
Marsh supports the proposition that aboriginal title is subject to the doctrine of adverse
possession.
83. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 587.
84. See generally F. Cohen, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 46-66 (1971) (fac-
simile of 1942 edition) [hereinafter cited as 1942 HANDBOOK].
85. Cohen, supra note 1, at 34-43.
86. See, e.g., Minnesota v. Hitchcock, 185 U.S. 373, 388-89 (1902); Spalding v. Chan-
dler, 160 U.S. 394, 405-06 (1896); Buttz v. Northern Pac. R.R., 119 U.S. 55, 69-70 (1886);
Beecher v. Wetherby, 95 U.S. 517, 526 (1877); Holden v. Joy, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 211, 245
(1872); Clark v. Smith, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 195, 200-01 (1839).
87. E.g., Williams v. City of Chicago, 242 U.S. 434, 437 (1917); United States v. Fer-
nandez, 35 U.S. (10 Pet.) 303, 304 (1836); United States v. Arrendondo, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 691,
747-48 (1832).
88. See 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 590-91.
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the fifth amendment for takings by the sovereign. Before the passage of
the Indian Claims Commission Act,89 a tribal claim for compensation
under the fifth amendment could be brought against the government
only if the tribe had been able to secure the passage of a statute waiving
sovereign immunity and granting jurisdiction to the Court of Claims to
hear the grievance. 90 Consequently, in only a handful of cases decided
before Tee-Hit-Ton was there direct controversy between an Indian
tribe and the federal government concerning the fifth amendment.
Nevertheless, in at least three of these cases, the Court held that the
government's confiscation of Indian land constituted a fifth amend-
ment taking.91
A fourth decision, the only pre-Tee-Hit-Ton case in which the
Court awarded compensation for what was unquestionably unrecog-
nized aboriginal title was United States v. Alcea Band of Tllamooks92
(Tillamooks I). In Tillamooks I, the Tillamooks tribe claimed a right
to compensation for land taken by the federal government pursuant to
executive order. Although the Court in Tillamooks I held that the tribe
was entitled to compensation, 93 only four members of the Court based
their decision on the fifth amendment.
In the plurality opinion, Justice Vinson reviewed the doctrine of
discovery cases, in which the Indians' aboriginal title had been charac-
terized as "sacred as the fee simple."'94 He concluded that the taking in
Tillamooks I was compensable even though the tribe's title had never
been recognized by a treaty, stating: "The Indians' right of occupancy
has always been held to be sacred; something not to be taken from him
89. 25 U.S.C. §§ 70 to 70v-3 (1976 & Supp. 111978) (pre-1946 claims); 28 U.S.C. § 1505
(1976) (post-1946 claims).
90. See generally, 1942 HANDBOOK, supra note 84, at 373-78; Wilkinson, Indian Tribal
Claims Before the Court of Claims, 55 GEo. L.J. 511, 512 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Wilkin-
son]. In one case, Spalding v. Chandler, 160 U.S. 394 (1896), the Court had acknowledged
Congress's power to take aboriginal land for public use. Congress had appropriated money
and paid the tribe, however;, thus, the fifth amendment was not in issue. Id. at 406.
91. United States v. Klamath & Moadoc Tribes, 304 U.S. 119 (1938); Shoshone Tribe
v. United States, 299 U.S. 476 (1937); United States v. Creek Nation, 295 U.S. 103 (1935).
These cases were distinguished in Tee-Hit-Ton as involving recognized and not merely ab-
original title. See text accompanying notes 139-53 infra.
92. 329 U.S. 40 (1946).
93. Id. at 54.
94. See, e.g., Mitchel v. United States, 34 U.S. (9 Pet.) 711, 746 (1835). See also United
States ex rel. Hualpai Indians v. Santa Fe Pac. R.R., 314 U.S. 339, 345 (1941); United States
v. Shoshone Tribe, 304 U.S. 111, 115 (1938); Minnesota v. Hitchcock, 185 U.S. 373, 389
(1902); Beecher v. Wetherby, 95 U.S. 517, 526 (1877); Leavenworth, Lawrence & Galveston
R.R. v. United States, 92 U.S. 733, 742 (1875); United States v. Cook, 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 591,
593 (1873); Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 48 (1831) (Baldwin, J., concur-
ring).
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except by his consent, and then upon such consideration as should be
agreed upon. '95
Concededly, the Court did not explicitly base its holding on the
fifth amendment. Nevertheless, as Justice Vinson pointed out, the rele-
vant jurisdictional act, permitting suit on "any and all legal and equita-
ble claims arising under or growing out of the original Indian title,"'96
could not itself create any new claims, but instead only authorized suit
for existing cognizable claims. 97 Given the absence of statutory author-
ity for the award, the only legal or equitable basis for the plurality deci-
sion was the fifth amendment, a conclusion reached by Professor
Cohen as well. 98 To Cohen, the decision in Tillamooks I followed in-
exorably as the next logical step from Johnson and its progeny, validat-
ing his thesis that the Court's cases on Indian title had created "a body
of law that has never rejected its first principles." 99
95. 329 U.S. at 52 (quoting Minnesota v. Hitchcock, 185 U.S. 373, 388-89 (1902)).
96. 329 U.S. at 41 (quoting Act of August 26, 1935, ch. 686, § 1, 49 Stat. 801 (1935)).
97. 329 U.S. at 45-46.
98. Cohen, supra note 1, at 47-59. Justice Black, in a concurring opinion, also argued
that the tribe was entitled to compensation, but only because the jurisdictional act itself had
created the claim. 329 U.S. at 54-55. Although cautioning against reliance on the plurality
opinion, Professor Cohen argued that substantively Justice Black differed from the plurality
only on the "metaphysical issue" of "rights dependling] on remedies." Cohen, supra note 1,
at 56. To the average Indian, Cohen noted, it would make no difference why the taking was
compensable, as long as it was compensable. Hence, at least to Professor Cohen, Tillamooks
I signaled that a majority of the Court found purely aboriginal title compensable. Id. at 56
& n.70. A similarly expansive reading of the case was given by the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals in Miller v. United States, 159 F.2d 997 (9th Cir. 1947). There the court held that a
tribe whose tidelands had been condemned was entitled to compensation. Although conced-
ing that the title to the land in issue was recognized, the court in Miller, citing Tillamooks I,
stated that the result of the case would have been no different had the Indians held aborigi-
nal title. Id. at 1005-06.
99. Cohen, supra note 1, at 47. Of the cases discussing Indian rights, only a few contain
derogatory language as to the nature of aboriginal title. See, e.g., Spalding v. Chandler, 160
U.S. 394 (1896); Buttz v. Northern Pac. R.R., 119 U.S. 55 (1886); Marsh v. Brooks, 55 U.S.
(14 How.) 513 (1852). In Marsh, the Court used the strongest negative language, speaking
contemptuously of "these loose Indian pretensions." 55 U.S. (14 How.) at 523. In Spalding
and Butt the Court seemed to downplay the importance of aboriginal title, terming the
right "merely" one of occupancy, the Spalding court somewhat schizophrenically calling it
"merely a title and right to the perpetual occupancy," 160 U.S. at 403, and the Buttz Court
considering it "merely a right of occupancy, a right to use the land subject to the dominion
and control of the government," 119 U.S. at 66.
The tenor of the language in each of these cases can be explained. In each case, two
non-Indians asserted adverse claims, long after the original Indian inhabitants had left the
land, one tracing title back to a tribal grant. In these cases, the Court's choice of language
reflected more its view of the bad case made by one of the parties than its view of the nature
of the original Indians' right to their lands. For example, it surely is not coincidence that the
Court used the strongest negative language in Marsh, where one claimant paid an Indian
tribe a few dollars in an attempt to acquire land peacefully settled and inhabited by another
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As a consequence of Tillamooks I, the Court of Claims awarded
the Tillamooks more than $3,000,000, with interest from the date of
taking. The government appealed the award on the ground that inter-
est should not have been part of the compensation. In its petition for
certiorari, the government argued that the compensation owed the tribe
was only the value of the land at the time of taking, because Tillamooks
I was based on a congressional directive to compensate the Indians for
the taking and not on the fifth amendment.'°° The distinction was crit-
ical; a fifth amendment taking requires payment not only of the value
of the land at the time of the taking, but also of the interest or its
equivalent to make the aggrieved party whole.' 0 ' The interest on this
$3,000,000 judgment, for example, brought the final judgment to more
than $17,000,000.
The Supreme Court granted the petition, limiting review to the
question of whether the earlier case had been based on the Constitution
or the jurisdictional act.'0 2 In United States v. Alcea Band of Til-
lamooks'03 (Tillamooks II), a unanimous per curiam decision, the
Court reversed the Court of Claims, stating: "Looking to the former
opinions in this case, we find that none of them expressed the view that
recovery was grounded on a taking under the Fifth Amendment."' 1 4
This statement must have astonished Indian lawyers, and Profes-
sor Cohen as well, for Justice Vinson had stated in his plurality opinion
in Tillamooks I that the jurisdictional act in that case did not create any
claims. 10 5 If a taking of aboriginal title was compensable at all, it
would have to be as a fifth amendment taking claim. Nevertheless, the
non-Indian for many years. The use of the phrase "loose Indian pretensions" would seem to
demonstrate more the Court's distaste for the attempted land grab than its real view of the
nature of aboriginal title.
100. Petition for Certiorari at 9-11, United States v. Alcea Band of Tillamooks, 341 U.S.
48 (1951). See also Brief for Petitioner at 17-20, United States v. Alcea Band of Tillamooks,
341 U.S. 48 (1951).
101. See, e.g., Shoshone Tribe v. United States, 299 U.S. 476, 497 (1937); United States
v. Creek Nation, 295 U.S. 103, 111 (1935) (based on implied promise to pay).
102. 340 U.S. 873 (1950).
103. 341 U.S. 48 (1951) (per curiam).
104. Id. at 49.
105. 329 U.S. at 45. See also Shoshone Tribe v. United States, 299 U.S. 476, 492-93
(1937); United States v. Mille Lac Band of Chippewa Indians, 229 U.S. 498, 500 (1913)
(statute conferring jurisdiction "on account of losses sustained" when a reservation was
opened for public settlement did not permit a court to give a remedy for "moral obliga-
tions," but only to apply existing legal principles); The Sac & Fox Indians of Iowa v. The
Sac & Fox Indians of Oklahoma, 220 U.S. 481, 489 (1911) (statute giving jurisdiction to
court to adjudicate legal and equitable claims did not create new rights). See generally 1942
HANDBOOK, svpra note 84, at 377 & nn.155 & 157.
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only possible interpretation of the Court's opinion in Tillamooks II was
that a taking of aboriginal title was compensable as a claim created by
the jurisdictional act. This interpretation implies that a taking of ab-
original land is not compensable in the absence of the creation of such
a claim by Congress. Since the Indian Claims Commission Act gave
the Court of Claims jurisdiction only over existing legal and equitable
claims against the government, °6 Tiiamooks II gave a strong warning
that post-1946 takings of aboriginal title would not be compensable,
thereby paving the way for Tee-Hit-Ton.
Tee-Hit-Ton: An Analysis of Precedent
The Concept of Recognized Title
As the previous analysis demonstrates, aboriginal title, as defined
in Johnson and developed by later cases, was never a meaningless con-
cept. Decisional law defining its features often referred to it as being
"sacred as the fee simple." 0 7 Both the Indians' aboriginal title and the
government's title had to be conveyed to give a successor a fee simple
absolute title. Although not alienable to a party other than the United
States Government, aboriginal title continued when the United States
Government granted Indian-held land without the natives' consent.
Only the sovereign legitimately could extinguish the Indians' aborigi-
nal title, and the acceptable methods of extinguishment were clearly
defined: the sovereign had general authority to acquire aboriginal title
through voluntary and consensual agreements with the Indians and
had an extremely limited power to acquire aboriginal title through con-
quest.
In view of the historical deference with which the courts had ad-
dressed the Indians' aboriginal title, evisceration of the concept in Tee-
Hit-Ton was both unexpected and damaging. Nevertheless, hindsight
reveals that some prior decisions did contain signals of the advent of
Tee-Hit-Ton and the concept of recognized title. Each of these cases,
usually in opinions written by Justice Reed, contained traces of the in-
cipient distinction between aboriginal and recognized title later to be-
come determinative in Tee-Hit-Ton.
The term "recognized title" was first used in a sense approximat-
ing its use in Tee-Hit-Ton by Justice Reed in the majority opinion in
106. 25 U.S.C. §§ 70a, 70v (1976).
107. Mitchel v. United States, 34 U.S. (9 Pet.) 711, 746 (1835). See also cases cited note
94 supra.
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Northwestern Bands of Shoshone Indians v. United States.10 8 The Court
in Northwestern Bands upheld the district court's dismissal of a claim
for a taking of 15,000,000 acres of tribal land on the ground that the
claim had not arisen from the treaty of Box Elder in 1863, as required
by the jurisdictional statute. Although the Box Elder treaty was similar
in wording to the Fort Laramie treaty, which had been held to deline-
ate the boundaries of tribal rights to land for the purpose of interpret-
ing another jurisdictional act, 109 the Court held that the less specific
language of the Box Elder treaty did not recognize the tribe's aborigi-
nal title."10 Consequently, the claim was not within the scope of the
jurisdictional act."'
In one sense, the opinion broke no new ground. The Court used
the term "recognized" merely to determine whether the claim was sub-
ject to the jurisdictional statute. Justice Reed pointed out that "[u]nder
the words of the jurisdictional act, 'arising under or growing out of the
treaty,' suit is authorized only for rights acknowledged by the
treaty."" 2 Therefore, "[i]f the treaty recognized the aboriginal or In-
108. 324 U.S. 335 (1945). According to Professor Cohen, this 5-4 decision "shocked the
national conscience." The case sparked many unsuccessful calls for rehearing, by, among
others, the Department of Interior, Judge Hudson of the Permanent Court of International
Justice, and the American Civil Liberties Union. F. Cohen, Indian Claims, in THE LEGAL
CONSCIENCE 264 (L. Cohen ed. 1960) [hereinafter cited as THE LEGAL CONSCIENCE].
109. See Fort Berthold Indians v. United States, 71 Ct. Cl. 308, 331-34 (1930).
110. Both the treaties of Fort Laramie and Box Elder dealt with the same topics-the
needs to establish roads and military posts and to secure freedom from attack for travelers
going through Indian land. The only real difference was in the wording used in the sections
acknowledging boundaries. In the Fort Laramie Treaty, the Indians "recognize[d] and ac-
knowledge[d] the following tracts of country." Treaty of Fort Laramie, Sept. 7, 1851, 11
Stat. 749. In the Box Elder Treaty the boundaries were delineated as follows: "The country
claimed for Pokatello, for himself and his people, is bounded on the west by Raft River and
on the east by the Porteneuf mountains." Treaty of Box Elder, July 30, 1863, 13 Stat. 663.
111. 324 U.S. at 347-54. Justices Douglas, Frankfurter, and Murphy dissented. Justice
Murphy argued that the Court should have applied the long-standing rule of liberal con-
struction of treaty language which required ambiguities to be resolved in favor of the tribe.
In construing the jurisdictional act's requirement that the claim arise from the treaty, he
would have held that the very fact the treaty sought and accepted rights of way through
Northwestern Band lands was sufficient "recognition and acknowledgment" of the Indians'
aboriginal title to the land. Id. at 366. In a separate opinion, Mr. Justice Douglas made a
similar argument, stating: "He who comes to my abode and bargains for free transit or a
right of way across the land on which I live and which I proclaim to be my own certainly
recognizes that I have a claim to it." Id. at 359. Mr. Justice Roberts voted to reverse the
Court of Claims but did not align himself with a dissenting opinion. Justices Black and
Jackson concurred with the majority, basing their opinion on the futility of redressing an-
cient wrongs committed against a small group of natives inhabiting a large area of land
when the original victims had "gone to the Happy Hunting Ground." Id. at 355. Justices
Black and Jackson's concurrence is discussed at text accompanying notes 208-14 infra.
112. 324 U.S. at 337.
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dian title, the authority to sue for the taking under the jurisdictional
act" existed."l 3 The desire of Congress to limit its waiver of sovereign
immunity to claims acknowledged by the treaty was understandable to
the Court, because Congress may not have desired to submit itself to
the "uncertainties of definition of boundaries and difficulties of proof
to establish aboriginal title for tribes with a shifting habitat."" 14
What was new in the case, however, was the designation of aborig-
inal title as merely "the right because of immemorial occupancy to
roam certain territory to the exclusion of any other Indians."" 5 This
kind of title was distinguishable, according to the Court, from "a recog-
nized right of occupancy."" 6 Although this passage was in the context
of the majority's discussion of the jurisdictional act, the Court for the
first time intimated that, absent the question of waiver of sovereign im-
munity, different rights might flow from recognized, as opposed to ab-
original, title.
The second most influential opinion by Justice Reed was his dis-
sent in Tillamooks 1. 117 In holding that a taking of aboriginal title was
compensable, Justice Vinson's plurality opinion in Tillamooks I had
explicitly rejected the government's defense that compensation was re-
quired only for a taking of recognized title. The government, he noted,
had "seized upon language of the Court of Claims. . . and from it had
fashioned a full-blown concept of 'recognized Indian title.' "18 To Jus-
tice Vinson, the recognition issue was only one of evidence: documents
showing the United States had recognized the boundaries of aboriginal
land obviated the time and expense necessary for a tribe to prove it
exclusively used and occupied the land at issue at the time it had been
lost by the tribe, often a hundred years before trial." 9
Justice Reed's dissent took issue with the plurality opinion's re-
fusal to adopt the recognized title distinction, asserting that since the
days of the Marshall Court there had been at least two types of Indian
title: "[Flirst, occupancy as aborigines until that occupancy is inter-
rupted by governmental order; and second, occupancy when by an act
of Congress they are given a definite area as a place upon which to
113. Id. at 337-38.
114. Id. at 340.
115. Id. at 338.
116. Id. at 339.
117. United States v. Alcea Band of Tillamooks, 329 U.S. 40, 55 (1946) (Reed, J., dis-
senting).
118. Id. at 49 (quoting Duwamish Indians v. United States, 79 Ct. Cl. 530 (1934)).
119. 329 U.S. at 50.
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live."'120 Justice Reed cited two sources of authority for this proposi-
tion: a number of special act opinions using the word "recognition" in
various contexts and a passage from Johnson v. M'Intosh12 1 which sub-
sequently proved pivotal in the Tee-Hit-Ton opinion.' 22
Before that controversy returned to the Supreme Court as Til-
lamooks II, however, a footnote in the 1949 case of Hynes v. Grimes
Packing Company123 put an end to the optimism sparked by the Ti-
lamooks I opinion. Ironically, Hynes did not raise a fifth amendment
question because it was concerned with regulation of fishing rights.124
Nevertheless, in dicta, Justice Reed once again stressed that only a res-
ervation created by a treaty can create any type of compensable interest
in the land, because "the quality of rights thereby secured to the occu-
pants of the reservation depends on the language or purpose of the con-
gressional action."' 125 Since there had been no treaty with the Karluk
Indians, their executive order reservations were "subject to the unfet-
tered will of Congress."' 126 The footnote appended to this statement
signaled the end of Indian advocates' dreams that aboriginal takings
were compensable, by stating that Tillamooks I did "not hold the In-
dian right of occupancy compensable without a specific legislative di-
rection to make payment."' 127 The summary reversal of the lower
court's fifth amendment award in Tillamooks II, therefore, was not
wholly unexpected.
120. Id. at 57.
121. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823).
122. For a discussion of Justice Reed's authority for the recognized title distinction, see
text accompanying notes 128-64 infra.
123. 337 U.S. 86 (1949).
124. Whether a tribe's fishing rights are aboriginal or treaty recognized, they may be
subject to reasonable and necessary regulations by the state or federal government to con-
serve the fishery, as long as the regulations are non-discriminatory against Indians. See
Puyallup Tribe v. Department of Game, 391 U.S. 392, 398 (1968) (if treaty is silent on man-
ner of fishing, state may regulate the manner of exercising treaty fishing rights so long as the
regulation meets appropriate standards and does not discriminate). Such regulations are
deemed a permissible exercise of the sovereign's police power. Regulations reasonably nec-
essary to promote health, safety, morals, or welfare require no just compensation even
though they may deprive an owner of his beneficial use. See, e.g., Goldblatt v. Hempstead,
369 U.S. 590, 592 (1962). See generall, 1 J. SACKMAN, NICHOLS' THE LAW OF EMINENT
DOMAIN §§ 1.42[l]-[8] (3d ed. rev. 1979) [hereinafter cited as NICHOLS].
125. 337 U.S. at 103.
126. Id. at 106.
127. Id. at 106 n.28. The Justice Department, reading this language as a signal of the
Court's willingness to narrow considerably the broad language of Tillamooks I, based its
argument in Tillamooksll1 on the interpretation of Tillamooks I in footnote 28. Brief for the
United States at 17-19, United States v. Alcea Band of Tillamooks, 341 U.S. 48 (1951).
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Despite the signposts in these opinions, and despite the language
in Justice Reed's opinion in Tee-Hit-Ton that reads as if the distinction
between recognized and aboriginal title had been long followed, most
cases before Tee-Hit-Ton completely ignored the character of Indian
title held by a tribe. 28 In fact, as the following passage from a 1902
opinion by the Court indicates, whether the land was aboriginal or res-
ervation land was often of no concern: "Whether this tract, which was
known as the Red Lake Indian reservation, was properly called.a reser-
vation, as the defendant contends, or unceded Indian country, as the
plaintiff insists, is a matter of little moment. Confessedly the fee of the
land was in the United States, subject to a right of occupancy by the
Indians."'' 29 Moreover, the Court had twice rejected the argument that
government recognition of aboriginal title was necessary to accord
rights in tribal land, the contention that became the cornerstone of Tee-
Hit-Ton. In Cramer v. United States 30 the Court said: "The fact that
such right of occupancy finds no recognition in any statute or other
formal governmental action is not conclusive. The right, under the cir-
cumstances here disclosed, flows from a settled governmental pol-
icy.' 13 1 The Court quoted this passage from Cramer in United States
ex rel Huaipai Indians v. Santa Fe Paciflc Railroad 32 (Walapai Tribe)
in which it had stated: "Nor is it true, as respondent urges, that a tribal
claim to any particular lands must be based upon a treaty, statute, or
other formal government action."' 133
Although Cramer and Walapai Tribe are evidence of the Court's
disregard of the concept of recognized title, the Court admittedly had
employed the term "recognition" in Indian claims cases prior to Tee-
Hit-Ton. Indeed, in Tee-Hit-Ton Justice Reed selected some of these
very cases 134 as authority for the proposition that "[w]here the Congress
128. See, e.g., Spalding v. Chandler, 160 U.S. 394 (1896). "The Indian title as against
the United States was merely a title and right to the perpetual occupancy of the land ...
When Indian reservations were created. . . the Indians held the land by the same character
of title .... ." Id. at 403. See also Nadeau v. Union Pac. R.R., 253 U.S. 442, 444, 446
(1920) (land reserved from a treaty guaranteeing "full and complete possession thereof 'as
their home forever'" was "but part of the domain held by the Tribe under the ordinary
Indian claim-the right of possession and occupancy-with the fee in the United States");
United States v. Mille Lac Band of Chippewa Indians, 229 U.S. 498, 500 (1913) (describing
reservation land as "reserved for the occupancy and use" of the tribe).
129. Minnesota v. Hitchcock, 185 U.S. 373, 388-89 (1902).
130. 261 U.S. 219 (1923).
131. Id. at 229.
132. 314 U.S. 339 (1941).
133. Id. at 347.
134. Sioux Tribe v. United States, 316 U.S. 317 (1942) (Treaty of 1868, jurisdictional act
was Act of June 3, 1920, ch. 222, 41 Stat. 738 (1920)); United States v. Klamath & Moadoc
Tribes, 304 U.S. 119 (1938) (Treaty of 1866; jurisdictional acts were Act of May 26, 1920, ch.
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by treaty or other agreement has declared that thereafter Indians were
to hold the lands permanently, compensation must be paid for subse-
quent taking."' 35 The five cited cases were connected by only two com-
mon features: first, in each case the tribe had made a treaty with the
United States, whereby the tribe received certain territory on which to
reside; and second, in each case the claim was brought under the au-
thority of a special jurisdictional act. 136
Justice Reed's reliance on these cases is questionable for several
reasons, the most significant being that the word "recognition" had no
unitary meaning. Some of the cases used the term with no apparent
fixed meaning; 37 one case did not use it at all.' 38 Far from acknowl-
edging a distinction between recognized and aboriginal title, the Court
in each case did not distinguish between two types of Indian title but
considered the concept of Indian title sufficient to encompass both. As
the following analysis indicates, none of these cases supports the dis-
tinction created in Tee-Hi-Ton.
United States v. Creek Nation, 39 the oldest of the five cases cited
by the Court, illustrates the weakness of the Court's assertion. In Creek
203, 41 Stat. 623, and Act of May 15, 1936, ch. 398, 49 Stat. 1276). Chippewa Indians v.
United States, 301 U.S. 358 (1937) (series of treaties cited id. 361 nn.3 & 4; jurisdictional acts
cited id. at 360 nn.1 & 2)); Shoshone Tribe v. United States, 299 U.S. 476 (1937) (treaty of
1868; jurisdictional act was Act of Mar. 3, 1927, ch. 302, 44 Stat. 1349); United States v.
Creek Nation, 295 U.S. 103 (1935) (series of treaties beginning in 1833; jurisdictional act was
Act of May 24, 1924, ch. 181, 43 Stat. 139).
135. 348 U.S. at 278-79.
136. See note 134 supra. Perhaps because he believed the Tillamooks II unanimous
opinion sounded the death knell for any theory of compensability for a taking of aboriginal
title, the attorney for the tribe in Tee-Hit-Ton did not even attempt to argue that a taking of
aboriginal title under the doctrine of discovery was protected by the fifth amendment. In-
stead, he based his argument on two theories: first, that the land tenure of the Alaska natives
was so completely different from that of Indians in the forty-eight contiguous states that the
doctrine of discovery cases did not apply to them. Their ownership, through aboriginal title,
was a "full proprietary ownership," more like fee simple ownership than mere original In-
dian title. See 348 U.S. at 277. Therefore, the fifth amendment required compensation for
takings of this type of title. In the alternative, he argued that the Organic Act of 1884 and
the Act of June 6, 1900, for a civil government for Alaska, had recognized their title, as that
term had been used in the recent Court opinions. See id. at 378. Indeed, even though there
were amici briefs submitted by the Attorneys General of Idaho, Utah, and New Mexico,
only Utah's brief contested the origin or logic of the theory that only recognized title was
compensable. Brief of the State of Utah, Amicus Curiae, at 4-7, Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v.
United States, 348 U.S. 272 (1955) (arguing that the distinction in favor of a "recognized
title" arose from "boilerplate language of the traditional jurisdictional act").
137. See, e.g., Chippewa Indians v. United States, 301 U.S. 358, 373 (1937); United
States v. Creek Nation, 295 U.S. 103, 106 (1935).
138. See Shoshone Tribe v. United States, 299 U.S. 476 (1937).
139. 295 U.S. 103 (1935).
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Nation, the claimant tribe owned Oklahoma land in fee simple. The
land was granted to the tribe by the United States in an 1833 treaty in
return for the Creek's ceding their aboriginal land in the East. 140 After
a later treaty ceding a portion of this fee simple land to the United
States, the government commissioned a survey to delineate the bounda-
ries of a portion of the ceded land which had been granted to another
tribe. Unfortunately, the survey was incorrect, resulting in the loss of
some of the Creek reserved lands. 141 Consequently, the tribe claimed
that the error resulted in a taking under the fifth amendment, requiring
the government to compensate the tribe for the loss.
The term "recognized" was used only once in the Creek Nation
opinion. In discussing an earlier disputed survey, the Court pointed
out that the tribe and the government settled their differences in that
dispute in an agreement in which the "tribe's ownership of the lands
east of [the] line was expressly recognized."' 142 In sustaining the fifth
amendment claim, however, the Court noted that the ownership inter-
est recognized was fee simple, "not the usual right of occupancy with
the fee in the United States." 43 Creek Nation thus provided limited
support for Justice Reed's premise, intimating that types of Indian title
other than fee simple might be treated differently. Nevertheless, at
most the opinion raised the possibility that fee simple title might be
regarded more favorably than other Indian title. Even this interpreta-
tion fails, however, in light of the result achieved in the second opinion
relied upon by Justice Reed: Shoshone Tribe v. United States, 44 a deci-
sion of even more questionable precedent than Creek Nation.
In Shoshone Tribe, the Court held that the forced settling of a
band of Arapahoes on the Shoshone reservation was a fifth amendment
taking of an undivided one-half interest in the Shoshone land. 145 Like
Creek Nation, Shoshone Tribe was brought under a special jurisdic-
tional act, covering "all legal and equitable claims. . . arising under or
growing out of the treaty of July 3, 1868."146 Although Justice Car-
dozo, the author of the opinion, did note that the Indians had the
"treaty right of occupancy with all its beneficial incidents," 147 the term
"recognition" was not mentioned; at no point did the Court distinguish
140. See Treaty of Feb. 14, 1833, 7 Stat. 417.
141. 295 U.S. at 105-07.
142. Id. at 106.
143. Id. at 109.
144. 299 U.S. 476 (1937).
145. Id. at 497.
146. Id. at 484-85 n.1 (quoting Act of Mar. 3, 1927, 44 Stat. 1349 (pt. 11)).
147. 299 U.S. at 496.
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between the treaty rights of occupancy and the rights of occupancy in-
cidental to aboriginal title as discussed in the discovery cases. Further-
more, the government had argued in Shoshone Tribe that irrespective
of whether the tribe claimed to have lost aboriginal or reservation land,
no type of Indian title ought be treated as a property right.148 By af-
firming the award, the Court rejected the government's claim, although
it failed to articulate the precise basis for the decision. Hence, although
the result in Shoshone Tribe may be consonant with the theory es-
poused in Tee-Hit-Ton, neither the language nor rationale supports a
judicially recognized distinction between aboriginal and recognized ti-
tle.
United States v. Klamath & Moadoc Tribes149 provides even less
persuasive authority for the Tee-Hit-Ton rule than does Shoshone
Tribe. The Court in Klamath & Moadoc held that the patenting of
reservation land to a road company without the tribes' consent was a
taking. 50 Although noting that the tribes' reservation derived from a
congressional treaty, the Court seemed concerned with the treaty only
to the extent of ascertaining whether the treaty took away any of the
tribes' aboriginal rights rather than determining if it gave the tribes any
new rights.' 51 More significantly, the result in Klamalh & Moadac does
not support the Tee-Hit-Ton rule. For a treaty to have recognized ab-
original title under Tee-Hit-Ton, the treaty must show a "definite inten-
tion. . . to accord legal rights, not merely permissive occupation."
1 52
Since Tee-Hit-Ton, treaty clauses, similar to those in Klamath &
Moadoc, giving the President ultimate authority over the disposition of
treaty land have been interpreted as language of divestment, depriving
the land of recognized title status.15 3 Consequently, the language of the
148. The Justice Department had stated in its brief that the United States could not take
reservation land except by eminent domain, but argued that there had been a breach of
treaty although no taking in this case. Brief for United States at 29-30, Shoshone Tribe v.
United States, 299 U.S. 476 (1937). Justice Reed was the Solicitor General during this pe-
riod.
149. 304 U.S. 119 (1938).
150. Id. at 124-25.
151. For example, the Court concluded that language in the treaty declaring that the
reservation should be set aside for the Indians until otherwise directed by the President did
not defeat the tribe's claim because it "clearly did not detract from the tribes' right of occu-
pancy." Id. at 123.
152. 348 U.S. at 279.
153. See, e.g., United States v. Kiowa, Comanche & Apache Tribes, 479 F.2d 1369,
1373-74 (Ct. Cl. 1973), cert. deniedsub nom. Wichita Indian Tribe v. United States, 416 U.S.
936 (1974). With the typical post-hoc reasoning of the Court of Claims cases after Tee-Hit-
Ton, the court in Kiowa distinguished Klamath & Moadoc as a case in which the treaty
language of divestment was undermined by subsequent actions, including Congress's pass-
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treaty in Klamath & Moadoc failed Tee-Hit-Ton's test of treaty lan-
guage sufficient to give a tribe recognized title. Hence, all three cases
granting fifth amendment compensation relied on in Tee-Hit-Ton fail
to support Justice Reed's opinion in that case.
The two cases relied on in Tee-Hit-Ton in which compensation
was denied also fail to provide support for a distinction between ab-
original and recognized title. In both cases, the denial was based on
reasons having nothing to do with recognition as defined in Tee-Hit-
Ton. In Chiopewa Indians v. United States, 54 several bands of Chip-
pewa Indians claimed a share of proceeds from the sale of aboriginal
lands of the Red Lake bands of Chippewas. The jurisdictional act gave
the Court of Claims jurisdiction over legal and equitable claims arising
out of an 1889 allotment act under which cessions by all the Chippewa
bands had been obtained.155 The other bands of Chippewa argued that
they had a right to share in the trust funds created with the profits from
sales of Red Lake ceded land and that they had an interest in the then-
existing Red Lake reservation land. The Supreme Court disagreed,
pointing out that the Red Lake bands had occupied the land in ques-
tion exclusively at the time of the negotiations and treaties. 56 Addi-
tionally, the Court stressed that United States officers had "recognized,
repeatedly and consistently, the occupancy and title of the Red Lake
bands." 157 Hence, the claimants in Chppewa Indians were unsuccess-
ful, not because they did not hold recognized title but because they
failed to prove that they possessed aboriginal title.
The Court used the term "recognition" in Chpewa Indians only
in the sense that the government had acknowledged the existence of
certain boundaries to a reservation. Moreover, the Court's discussion
of the Red Lake bands' interest in the land demonstrates that the Court
found the treaty relevant or significant only in determining whether the
treaty had destroyed aboriginal land rights, not whether the treaty had
granted any. The Court decided the treaty had not destroyed aborigi-
nal rights, concluding that the Red Lake bands had retained their "full
ing of the jurisdictional act allowing the tribe to sue, which showed intent to recognize. 479
F.2d at 1375. In addition, the court pointed out that the language of divestment in Klamath
& Moadoc ("until otherwise directed by the President," 304 U.S. at 123) did not express a
territorial limitation as did the language in Kiowa ("or such portion of the same as may
hereafter from time to time be designated by the President," 479 F.2d at 1374). For other
decisions on what acts suffice for recognition, see text accompanying notes 251-75 infta.
154. 301 U.S. 358 (1937).
155. Act of May 14, 1926, ch. 300, § 1, 44 Stat. 555.
156. 301 U.S. at 372.
157. Id. at 372-73.
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Indian title" when they reserved some of their aboriginal land from the
cession.158 Certainly if the Court had regarded only recognized title,
and not aboriginal title, as a property right, the Court would not have
emphasized this point.
The remaining case, Sioux Tribe v. United States,5 9 did not in-
volve aboriginal land at all. The tribe claimed that when the President
abolished a temporary reservation created by an executive order on
previously ceded land, the tribe had a right to compensation. Aborigi-
nal title was not in issue, because the tribe had relinquished any aborig-
inal rights by an earlier voluntary cession of their land. 160 In denying
compensation, the Court distinguished between reservations reserved
from a treaty of cession and those created by the President out of the
public domain.' 6 ' When the land in Sioux Tribe was ceded by the
tribe, the aboriginal title was extinguished and the land became public
domain. The case merely held that, although the President has the au-
thority to create reservations on public domain lands, 62 such reserva-
tions, being temporary, do not give a tribe compensable property
rights. 163
As this analysis reveals, the Court's reliance on these five cases was
misplaced. By treating the concept of recognition as an historical un-
derpinning of case law, the Court has forced lower courts to ascertain
whether one hundred year old treaties and statutes were intended by
Congress to "recognize" title within the meaning of Tee-Hit-Ton. Ac-
complishing this feat of judicial legerdemain is particularly difficult be-
cause, before Tee-Hit-Ton, Congress was not cognizant of a distinction
between recognized and aboriginal title. The results of subsequent ju-
dicial attempts to find congressional intent, consequently, are less than
consistent.164
Extinguishment by Conquest
In holding in Tee-Hit-Ton that aboriginal title was not a compen-
sable property interest under the fifth amendment, Justice Reed relied
heavily on the doctrine of discovery cases, and in particular on Johnson
158. Id. at 371.
159. 316 U.S. 317 (1942).
160. See id. at 318.
161. Id. at 326.
162. See note 237 infra.
163. 316 U.S. at 330. For a discussion of the implications of Sioux Tribe in conjunction
with Tee-Hit-Ton, see notes 241-50 & accompanying text infra.
164. For an example of the confusion caused by the pretense that the term "recognition"
has a unitary meaning, see Annot., 41 A.L.R. FED. 425, 450-52 (1979).
July 1980] ABORIGINAL TITLE
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
v. M'Intosh.165 Unfortunately, the portion of the Tee-Hit-Ton opinion
discussing these cases is poorly structured. The Court first quoted sev-
eral lengthy passages from Johnson, followed with several assertions of
fact regarding the case in controversy, and finished by purporting to
state the obvious conclusion.166 Despite the Court's poor drafting, one
can nevertheless discern a semblance of logic in the opinion. Initially,
the Court noted that conquest was a legitimate means of extinguishing
aboriginal title. 167 Recognizing this, the Court went on to suggest that
the government and its predecessors, as a matter of historical fact, had
conquered the Indians, either through actual warfare or by forcing
treaties on the Indians. 68 Consequently, all aboriginal title had been
extinguished before Tee-Hit-Ton, with the exception of the title Con-
gress had chosen to grant back to the Indians.169
The Court in Tee-Hit-Ton relied on Johnson to provide the corner-
stone for converting the doctrine of discovery to this doctrine of con-
quest. 170 Two passages from Johnson regarding extinguishment of
Indian title by conquest were cited, including the statement that
"[c]onquest gives a title which the Courts of the conqueror cannot
deny, whatever the private and speculative opinions of individuals may
be respecting the original justice of the claim which has been success-
fully asserted."'171 The Court's reliance on these passages from Johnson
was misplaced for several reasons. The only war relevant to the deci-
sion in Johnson was the war between France and England to settle En-
gland's claim to the land east of the Mississippi, including the land in
165. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1923).
166. See 348 U.S. at 279-85.
167. Id. at 279-82.
168. Id. Justice Reed first advanced this thesis in the majority opinion in Northwestern
Bands of Shoshone Indians v. United States, 324 U.S. 335 (1945). He stated that "the white
sovereign" had the power to extinguish Indian title by purchase or conquest and implied
that conquest had taken place. "The whites enforced their claims by the sword and occupied
the lands as the Indians abandoned them." Id. at 339.
169. 348 U.S. at 281-82.
170. To Justice Reed, Johnson "denied the power of an Indian tribe to pass their right of
occupancy to another." 348 U.S. at 279-80. In fact, Johnson held only that the sale to the
first buyers could only convey the tribes' occupancy rights since the fee was in the United
States. A later sale of the same occupancy rights by the tribe to the United States gave the
government the full title. The wronged prior purchasers could seek redress only under tribal
law. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 591-93. As stated above, the later decision in Mitchel made it
clear that Indian tribes may alienate their occupancy right, though the sovereign's consent is
necessary for the buyer to take a fee simple title. See text accompanying notes 63-74 supra.
171. 348 U.S. at 280 (quoting Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 588). The
second passage stated that "discovery gave an exclusive right to extinguish the Indian title of
occupancy, either by purchase or by conquest." 348 U.S. at 280 (quoting Johnson v.
M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 587).
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controversy in the case.172 This war in no way affected the Indian
tribes' interest in their land, as the opinion pointed out.173 Hence, the
language was merely dicta.
The dicta in Johnson regarding extinguishment of Indian title by
conquest' 74 does not support Justice Reed's conclusion that all Indian
land had been conquered. Authorities differ on whether Justice Mar-
shall actually recognized conquest as a valid method of extinguishment
of Indian title under American law.175 Regardless of how the passages
in Johnson are interpreted, however, it is evident that Johnson did not
establish that all Indian title had been extinguished by conquest, for
Johnson itself,' 76 as well as its progeny, 7 7 recognized that purchase
was the primary method of extinguishment of Indian title. Had discov-
ery itself extinguished Indian title to land, most of the decisions in
those cases would have been unnecessary.
In addition, Justice Reed's use of the term "conquest" is itself
questionable. Both at the time of Johnson and today, conquest has
been a narrow concept with clearly defined effects on the conquered
people.178 For example, conquest generally requires some sort of phys-
ical possession by force of arms.179 Thus, the conclusion that all Indian
land has been conquered was as illogical as it was unprecedented.
Even if Justice Reed meant only that the congressional resolution at
issue in Tee-Hit-Ton was the functional equivalent of a declaration of
war followed by conquest, such a conclusion was not warranted by ei-
ther the language of the resolution'80 or the rules of international law
regarding conquest.'18 Finally, even if the federal government's actions
172. See 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 581-85.
173. Id. at 583.
174. Id. at 590-91, quotedin Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States, 348 U.S. at 280.
175. Compare Henderson, Unraveling the Riddle of Aboriginal Title, 5 AM. INDIAN L.
REv. 77, 92-93 (1977) (Marshall recognized conquest as a potential method of extinguish-
ment in international law, but rejected conquest in American law) with Berman, The Concept
of.AboriginalRights in the Early LegalHistory ofthe United States, 27 BUFFALO L. REv. 637,
647, 656, 660-64 (1978) (Marshall recognized conquest as legal in American law in Johnson,
but narrowed the concept to permit extinguishment only by defensive wars in Worcester).
176. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 585, 587, 593, 603.
177. See text accompanying notes 31-127 supra.
178. Compare Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 589-90 (1923), with L. OP-
PENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 566-74 (8th ed., H. Lauterpacht ed. 1955).
179. See L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 566 (8th ed., H. Lauterpacht ed. 1955).
Modem international law has disapproved conquest as a valid method of acquiring terri-
tory. See, e.g., R. JENNINGS, THE ACQUISITION OF TERRITORY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 53-
68 (1963); C. RHYNE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 103 (1971); G. VON GLAHN, LAW AMONG NA-
TIONs 280-88 (2d ed. 1971).
180. See text accompanying notes 13-15 supra.
181. See note 179 supra.
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in the forty-eight contiguous states could have been interpreted as ex-
amples of the "conqueror's will," the Alaska natives had never fought a
skirmish with either Russia or the United States, but instead welcomed
newcomers to Alaska with open arms. To say that the Alaska natives
were subjugated by conquest stretches the imagination too far. The
only sovereign act that can be said to have conquered the Alaska native
was the Tee-Hit-Ton opinion itself.
Extinguishment as a Political Question
In constructing the rule of Tee-Hit-Ton, Justice Reed asserted that
the decision of Congress to recognize aboriginal title was not subject to
judicial review.' 82 This conclusion logically followed from two unex-
pressed premises: first, that political questions, such as the decision to
declare war, are not justiciable; and second, that extinguishment of In-
dian title is a purely political question. In support of the latter premise,
the court placed critical reliance on language from two cases, Beecher v.
Wetherby'83 and United States ex rel. Hualpai Indians v. Santa Fe Pa-
c,_fc Railroad184 (Walapai Tribe).
Beecher involved a dispute over tribal land the United States
granted to Wisconsin in 1848, before the tribe's aboriginal title had
been extinguished. The United States Government subsequently at-
tempted to cede the land back to the tribe, despite its prior grant of the
land to Wisconsin. Both the plaintiff and defendant claimed title to
lumber taken from the land, the plaintiffs claim based on a United
States patent issued in 1872 and the defendant's claim based on the
State's issuance of patents in 1865 and 1870. In holding only the grant
by Wisconsin valid, the Court stated that "the propriety or justice of
.. .[the government's] action towards the Indians with respect to their
lands is a question of governmental policy, and is not a matter open to
discussion in a controversy between third parties, neither of whom de-
rives title from the Indians."'' 85
The Court's position in Beecher was sound. Because many land
titles can be traced to a period of Indian occupancy, judicial time and
individual resources would be wasted if third parties were permitted to
contest the sovereign's decision to extinguish the tribal right of occu-
pancy. Additionally, there seems little justification in allowing a third
party to contest the sovereign's decision with respect to a tribe if the
182. 348 U.S. at 280-81.
183. 95 U.S. 517 (1877).
184. 314 U.S. 339 (1941).
185. 95 U.S. at 525, quoted in Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States, 348 U.S. at 281.
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tribe itself is an uninterested party. Tee-Hit-Ton was not a controversy
between third parties, but a direct controversy between a native Alaska
tribe and the government. Hence, what proved to be a compelling jus-
tification in Beecher was wholly lacking under the facts of Tee-Hit-Ton.
Indeed, a contest between a tribe and the government regarding the
consequences of congressional extinguishment or the government's lia-
bility seems to be precisely the sort of matter subject to judicial review.
Walapai Tribe is equally unsupportive of Tee-Hit-Ton's conclu-
sion that all aspects of congressional authority to extinguish aboriginal
title are nonreviewable. In Walapai Tribe, the United States brought
suit as guardian of the tribe to enjoin the railroad's interference with
the tribe's rightful enjoyment and possession of its territory. The rail-
road defended on the grounds that the tribe's aboriginal title had been
extinguished. In holding that the tribe's aboriginal title had not been
extinguished, the Court first carefully pointed out, in language directly
conflicting with the later Tee-Hit-Ton holding, that a tribal claim to
particular land did not have to be based on "a treaty, statute or other
formal government action' 8 6 to be actionable. Justice Reed did not
emphasize this statement, however, relying instead on language in
Walapai Tribe stating "the power of Congress. . . [with respect to ex-
tinguishment] is supreme. The manner, method and time of such extin-
guishment raise political, not justiciable, questions."'' 8 7
Despite this language recognizing the extinguishment power of
Congress, Walapai Tribe does not support the conclusion that all as-
pects of congressional authority to extinguish aboriginal title are im-
mune from judicial review. First, Walapai Tribe, like Beecher,
involved adverse claims by third parties. Hence, the nonreviewability
of congressional determinations to extinguish was again justifiable as a
means of sparing the unnecessary time and expense associated with a
contest of congressional activities by third parties. Second, the restric-
tion of the Court's power of review was not directed at the conse-
quences of congressional extinguishment, but only at the fact and
method of extinguishment. Concededly, in the presence of a clear
manifestation of congressional intent, the Court may not hold that
Congress has no power to extinguish, for clearly it does. The conse-
quences of congressional extinguishment, however, are precisely the in-
cidents of congressional authority subject to judicial review.' 88 Hence,
although the language in Walapai Tribe may support the assertion that
186. 341 U.S. at 347.
187. Id, quoted in Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States, 348 U.S. at 281.
188. See Delaware Tribal Business Comm. v. Weeks, 430 U.S. 73, 84 (1977) (power of
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only Congress has the power to extinguish Indian title, it does not sup-
port the assertion that the Court may not review the consequences of
Congress asserting its power.189
Speculation on Tee-Hit-Ton: The Court's Motivation
The break from precedent in Tee-Hi 9-Ton'0 cannot but help raise
questions about the dramatic shift in the Court's attitude toward Indian
rights. Justice Reed's characterization in Tee-Hit-Ton of the Indians as
"savage tribes," having only "permission from the [W]hites to occupy,"
and thus entitled only to "gratuities" from the sovereign' 9' reflects a
remarkably different view than Chief Justice Marshall's characteriza-
tion in Johnson of the Indian tribes as sovereign nations made up of
persons possessed of the same human rights as citizens of the discover-
ing nations. 92 There are several possible explanations for this shift of
tone.
Realism
One possible explanation for the Court's departure from precedent
in Tee-Hit-Ton is that earlier opinions deliberately misrepresented rela-
tions between the government and Indian tribes as generally amicable,
at a time when the government's activities involved confrontations with
Congress over Indian affairs does not bar judicial determination of fifth amendment and
equal protection claims).
189. Id. Even if Congress does have the unreviewable power to extinguish without com-
pensation when it chooses to do so explicitly, the relevant statute in Tee-Hit-Ton suggests
that Congress intended the courts to decide its liability for the taking of the timber because
§ 3(b) of the resolution stated: "Nothing in this resolution shall be construed as recognizing
or denying the validity of any claims of possessory rights to lands or timber within the exte-
rior boundaries of the Tongass National Forest." H.R.J. Res. 205, 61 Stat. 920, 921 (1947)
(emphasis added).
190. In addition to the cases discussed above, the Court distinguished two other major
cases, Minnesota v. Hitchcock, 185 U.S. 373 (1902), and United States v. Klamath &
Moadoc Tribes, 304 U.S. 119 (1930), as inapposite because they involved recognized title.
348 U.S. at 282 n.15. The Court also cited without comment three other cases in support of
the conquest theory, only one containing language supporting the rationale in Tee-Hit-Ton:
Buttz v. Northern Pac. R.R., 119 U.S. 55 (1886); Martin v. Waddell, 41 U.S. (6 Pet.) 367
(1842); and Clark v. Smith, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 195 (1839). Both Buttz and Clark support the
basic tenets of the doctrine of discovery as it existed before Tee-Hit-Ton. Martin involved a
controversy between third parties concerning rights to oyster beds. The plaintiff claimed
through the original proprietors of the colony; the defendant claimed through the state of
New Jersey. Neither party claimed through an Indian tribe. In the one line referring to
Indians in the thirty-two page opinion, the Court stated that Indians were regarded as "mere
temporary occupants of the soil." 41 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 409. That passage certainly is insuffi-
cient to support the view that Indian title is not a property right.
191. 348 U.S. at 289, 279, 291 (respectively).
192. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 591-92.
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Indians and confiscation of aboriginal land. 93 Despite Chief Justice
Marshall's direct exposure to such a confrontation in Worcester, one
might claim he chose to romanticize the Indian tribes to create the ap-
pearance of fair dealings between the United States Government and
the tribes. Justice Reed's view of history in Tee-Hit-Ton on the other
hand, may be more accurate, representing a trend toward honesty on
the part of the Court.
Even if true, this argument is unconvincing as either an explana-
tion of or justification for the rule in Tee-Hit-Ton. As an explanation
of the decision, it fails to account for Chief Justice Marshall's candid
recognition that many people believed Indians had no right to their
land because of their inferior culture,' 94 an argument made to the
Court in the earlier case of Fletcher v. Peck,195 as well as by the defend-
ant's attorney in Johnson.196 This belief may have explained to the
Chief Justice why the European nations applied the doctrine of discov-
ery, once confined to unoccupied land, to an inhabited country. It can-
not justify, however, a rule of law that would deny any rights to the
indigenous people.
Even if Chief Justice Marshall's romantic view did not reflect the
Indians' real predicament, there was no need for the Court in Tee-Hit-
Ton to depart from the legal path established by the Marshall prece-
dents. The doctrine of discovery had, before Tee-Hit-Ton, proved an
effective means of reconciling conflicting claims to aboriginal lands.
The fact that the government had not uniformly complied with its
stated legal principles is no reason to reject those principles, particu-
larly when the principles provide the legal basis for a group's claim to
property. To reject a rule of law establishing the rights of Indians to
their land on the ground that the government frequently aided or en-
couraged the confiscation of Indian land is no more persuasive than the
argument that because the government encouraged the perpetuation of
second class status for Blacks, the rule of Brown v. Board of Educa-
193. Arguably, Felix Cohen contributed to an idealized view depicting the relations be-
tween the tribes and the government as generally honorable with few exceptions. See THE
LEGAL CONSCIENCE, supra note 108, at 273-304.
194. See Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 573 (1823).
195. 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810). The plaintiff had argued that "[the soil] is overrun by
them, rather than inhabited. It is not a true and legal possession. . . . It is a right not to be
transferred, but extinguished." Id. at 121 (reporter's summary of argument for plaintiff).
196. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823). The defendant had argued that Indians "remained
in a state of nature, and have never been admitted into the general society of nations." Id. at
567 (reporter's summary of argument for defendant).
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tion,197 establishing the equality of Blacks and Whites, is dishonest and
therefore should be rejected.
Fiscal Considerations
A second, more plausible explanation for the Court's shift in tone
is that the Court was faced with serious fiscal considerations. The rule
in Tee-Hit-Ton may represent the Court's attempt to save the public
treasury from having to pay out what were perceived as nearly ruinous
damage awards on claims pending before the Indian Claims Commis-
sion. By promulgating the rule in Tee-Hit-Ton, the Court left Congress
free to extinguish aboriginal title to Alaska, where the land's wealth in
resources was just becoming known, 19 8 without incurring a duty to
compensate the natives.
In Tee-Hit-Ton, the Court's concern with fiscal considerations was
more obvious than it had been in Tillamooks II, where the argument
first had been made. In Tillamooks II, the Government appended an
exhibit to its brief that listed all the claims filed with the newly-created
Indian Claims Commission prior to August 11, 1950, the cut-off date
for claims arising before 1946. The appendix was designed to demon-
strate the potential liability of the United States if all the land claims
then pending were held to be takings under the fifth amendment,
thereby requiring an interest award. The resulting sum was over
$9,000,000,000, of which $8,000,000,000 was interest. 199 Apparently the
appendix proved effective in Tillamooks 11, convincing the three jus-
tices remaining on the Court from the Tillamooks I majority, including
Chief Justice Vinson, to reverse the award of interest.
Justice Reed in Tee-Hit-Ton explicitly acknowledged the influence
of the Tillamooks II appendix by citing its $9,000,000,000 estimate.2°°
The Court's willingness to accept the government's estimate is surpris-
ing. Perhaps the Justices did not realize that the land claims before the
Indian Claims Commission could be based on legal theories not requir-
ing an award of interest, guch as breach of trust or contract. The inclu-
sion of all the land claims thus inflated the final figure. Irrespective of
whether the Justices should have known that not all the land claims
197. 394 U.S. 294 (1955).
198. See FEDERAL FIELD COMMITTEE FOR DEVELOPMENT PLANNING IN ALASKA,
ALASKA NATIVES AND THE LAND 406-08 (1968) (Arctic Slope oil discoveries in the 1940's
and 1950's). See generally id. 285-426 (Alaska natural resources).
199. Brief for Petitioner at 55-56, United States v. Alcea Band of Tillamooks, 341 U.S.
48 (1951).
200. 348 U.S. at 283 n.17.
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were taking claims, for which an award of interest would be necessary,
they surely were aware of two general observations about lawsuits; first,
that litigants claim much more in damages than they reasonably expect
to recover; and second, that litigants often lose. Indeed, the ultimate
disposition of the claims proves that the Court should have more
closely scrutinized the government's figures. The total amount of dam-
ages awarded by the Commission on all the land claims for which the
Justice Department had listed estimates came to slightly less than
$150,000,000. Even if all these claims could have been pressed as fifth
amendment taking claims, with the judgments entitled to interest, the
resulting liability would have been slightly over $1,000,000,000, well
below the government's estimate.20 1
Ethnocentrism
Understanding American governmental policy toward Indian
tribes during the time of Tee-Hit-Ton affords some insight into the
Court's willingness to permit concerns of the public purse to enter its
constitutional decisionmaking process. The termination era of the
1950's was the second of two major eras20 2 in which Congress at-
201. The author's research assistants, Dorothy Mayer and Hildegarde Conte, arrived at
this figure by determining the final awards given for each of the claims represented by a
docket number in the government's appendix. Of the approximately 124 claims listed by the
Justice Department, only 33 were land claims in which the tribe was ultimately successful.
The total amount awarded on these claims was $148,065,930.00 (table on file with the au-
thor). The subsequent history of each docket was obtained by crosschecking the information
on final awards in the annual report of the Indian Claims Commission with the subsequent
history tables of the two privately published indexes to the Commission's decisions. Until a
rudimentary subject matter index was published in 1973, the lack of any research guides to
Commission decisions forced researchers to read all the decisions to determine how the
Commission had resolved an issue. Although a subject matter index now exists, its subjects
are too broad to be very helpful. See NATIVE AMERICAN RIGHTS FUND, INDEX TO INDIAN
CLAIMS COMMISSION DECISIONS 4 (1973) (NARF). The NARF Index also contains a subse-
quent history table. The other private index contains only an index by docket number, with
subsequent histories and a case name index. DECISIONS OF THE INDIAN CLAIMS COMMIS-
SION (Clearwater Press 1973). Neither index is up-to-date.
202. The first was the allotment era of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.
During this tine, the government negotiated large cessions of Indian land. The ceded land
was then broken up into 160-acre allotments for individual Indians. Two ideas pervaded
this scheme. First, the large amount of land left over after the allotments were made could
be opened up for the great number of white settlers clamoring for public domain land. Sec-
ond, individual Indians would have every impetus to become members of the dominant
culture, as opposed to members of a tribe. Since there would be no more tribal land held in
common, the tribe's strength as a culture would weaken. Meanwhile, individual Indians
would settle, learn husbandry, and gradually adapt to the dominant culture. The allotment
era had a devastating effect on Indian land and population, and finally came to an end with
the passage of the Wheeler-Howard Act in 1934. 25 U.S.C. §§ 461-479 (1976). During the
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tempted to terminate any special status conferred on Indian tribes as
separate sovereigns by steps designed to assimilate Indians into the
dominant culture. In 1954, Congress passed a resolution calling for the
termination of federal trust responsibility over Indians. 20 3 This goal
was to be accomplished by extinguishing tribal land, paying individual
tribal members for their share, and allowing the states to exercise civil
and criminal jurisdiction over the Indian reservations within their bor-
ders. Congress hoped through legislation to deprive the Indians of sep-
arate sovereignty and to subject them, and their land, to the same state
sovereignty as non-Indian state citizens. 20 4
The termination era, regarded as a low point in United States-
Indian relations, 20 5 did no more than reflect the dominant culture's be-
lief in the superiority of its culture. Americans, many of whom had
been assimilated from diverse cultures within one generation, generally
were unwilling to accept the American Indian tribes' failure to adapt
after several hundred years.206 Policy makers reasoned that the more
Indians were given any kind of special treatment, the less likely they
would be to adopt the ways of the dominant culture. 20 7 Thus, assimila-
tionists were opposed to according Indians any special legal status.
Members of the Supreme Court were not immune from these con-
cerns. Justices Jackson and Black expressed their qualms about Indian
land claims litigation in a concurring opinion in Northwestern Bands of
Shoshone Indians v. United States.20 8 They asserted that a moral duty
alone was owed the Indian tribes, because the Indians' predicament
posed more sociological than legal problems. 209 To the two Justices,
interpreting the old treaties was a futile task because the Indians had a
different concept of land ownership:
1930's and 1940's, congressional Indian policy became more benign. The Indian land base
was stabilized, or in some cases augmented, by the return of some unallotted land to reserva-
tion status; tribal organizations grew stronger and the Indian population began to increase.
See generally S. TYLER, A HISTORY OF INDIAN POLICY 95-124 (1973).
203. H.R. Con. Res. 108, 83d Cong., 1st Sess., 99 CONG. REc. 6283 (1954).
204. See Wilkinson & Biggs, The Evolution of the Termination Policy, 5 AM. INDIAN L.
REV. 139, 148-51 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Termination Policy].
205. The era was particularly bleak for Indians in the West, who lost their land and
autonomy. Id. at 149-58. See also I AMERICAN INDIAN POLICY REVIEW COMMISSION, 93d
CONG., 2d SESS., FINAL REPORT 447-54 (Comm. Print 1978). Not until the late 1950's did
public sentiment begin to shift. See Termination Policy, supra note 203, at 162-63.
206. See generally Washburn, The Historical Context of American Indian Legal
Problems, 40 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 12 (1976).
207. See Termination Policy, supra note 203, at 162-63.
208. 324 U.S. 335, 354 (1955). (Jackson, J., concurring).
209. Id. at 355.
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Ownership meant no more to them than to roam the land as a great
common, and to possess and enjoy it in the same way that they pos-
sessed and enjoyed sunlight and the west wind and the feel of spring
in the air. Acquisitiveness, which develops a law of real property, is
an accomplishment only of the "civilized." 210
Accordingly, language assented to by the Indians in treaties may have
had no meaning or significance to them.
Two aspects of these claims caused the Justices particular concern.
First, they rejected the contention that a tribe of only 1,500 at the time
of the treaty could have "owned" the 15,000,000 acres that were the
subject of the Treaty of Box Elder.211 Second, they were disturbed that
the wronged generation of Shoshones, "hav[ing] gone to the Happy
Hunting Ground," would leave their present day descendants, who
were already accorded special status, a windfall award.212 If the Indi-
ans had no sense of private property, the Justices concluded, why
should the Court require the Government to give the Indians, "who
needed 10,000 acres apiece to sustain themselves through hunting and
nomadic living," 21 3 the value of land measured "in terms of what was
gained to our people, who sustain themselves in large numbers on few
acres by greater efficiency and utilization?" 214
This same ethnocentric tone was reflected in Tee-Hil-Ton. In the
first paragraph of the opinion, Justice Reed pointed out that the case
involved the claims of only sixty to seventy Indians to over 350,000
acres of land.21 5 Later in the opinion, in concluding that the Alaska
natives' aboriginal rights were the same as those of the Indians of the
lower forty-eight states, he repeated the figures, apparently in disbelief
that such a small number of natives could claim to own so many acres
just because they "moved from place to place as game or fish became
scarce."
216
210. Id. at 357.
211. Id. at 356.
212. Id. at 355.
213. Id. at 358.
214. Id. Professor Cohen called this view of Indians' relationships to their lands the
"menagerie theory" because it views the Indians as being more like animals foraging for
food than human beings having a culture worthy of respect. 1942 HANDBOOK, supra note
84, at 288. See generaly,, THE LEGAL CONSCIENCE, supra note 108, at 266-68; Cohen, supra
note 1, at 57-58. Professor Cohen also expressed dismay that in Northwestern Bands "two of
the most progressive judges of the Supreme Court" had adopted the menagerie theory. THE
LEGAL CONSCIENCE, supra note 108, at 267. He did note, however, that the number of
Whites occupying the land at the time of the lawsuit was less than the number of Shoshone
occupants at the time of the treaty. See id.
215. 348 U.S. at 273.
216. Id. at 287.
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The two concerns expressed by Justices Black and Jackson in their
concurrence in Northwestern Bands help explain the Court's reliance on
fiscal considerations in Tee-Hit-Ton. The native Alaskans' claim of
ownership to most of Alaska was based on the same nomadic land use
pattern as the Tlingits' in Tee-Hit-Ton. Hence, it was obvious that the
case would have a far greater impact than merely determining the
value of the timber cut in the Tongass Forest. In addition, the Indian
Claims Commission cases, often based on the same nomadic land use
pattern, addressed the propriety of awarding money judgments to the
descendants of the generation originally wronged. The Tee-Hit-Ton
rule provided the court with a way to avoid sanctioning a land use
pattern its members regarded as inferior, to give Congress a free hand
to acquire Alaska, and to protect the Treasury from having to pay large
money judgments to the "descendants of exploited Indians.' ' 21 7 Thus,
deep-seated ethnocentric thinking, coupled with a concern for ruinous
damage awards against the government, may well have motivated the
Court in Tee-Hit-Ton.
The previous analysis demonstrates several significant shortcom-
ings with the Court's rationale in Tee-Hit-Ton. First, the decision,
though purportedly based on the doctrine of discovery, succeeded in
significantly limiting the protection that doctrine traditionally has af-
forded Indian-held aboriginal title. The distinction between recog-
nized and aboriginal title relied on by the Court was derived from
erroneous interpretations of precedent and was used to rationalize pre-
vious holdings by the Court in which the existence of such a distinction
had never been acknowledged. By adopting the distinction, the Court
not only made an unwarranted break from the prior deferential treat-
ment of Indian title by the Court, but undermined what traditionally
had been regarded as a form of ownership having the characteristics of
a legal property right.218
217. Id. at 274.
218. Notwithstanding the historic deference accorded aboriginal title, other reasons exist
for regarding aboriginal title as a compensable property right. The United States Supreme
Court itself has defined property for the purposes of the fifth amendment as "the group of
rights inhering in the citizen's relations to the physical thing, as the right to possess, use and
dispose of it . . . . The Constitutional provision is addressed to every sort of interest the
citizens may possess." United States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 378 (1945),
cited in 2 NICHOLS, supra note 124, § 5.1[l], at 5-8 n.6 (emphasis deleted). This definition
resembles that proposed by Bentham, who identified the following four characteristics of
property: the right of occupation, the right of exclusion, the right of alienation, and the right
of transmission after death. 3 J. BENTHAM, BENTHAM'S WORKS 182 (1843), quoted in 2
NICHOLS, supra note 124, § 51.1(1), at 5-8. Both recognized and aboriginal title satisfy all
but the third of these characteristics, the right to transfer aboriginal title having been re-
stricted in an effort to protect Indians. Federal Power Comm'n v. Tuscarora Indian Nation,
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Second, the Court bolstered its conclusion through misplaced reli-
ance on cases holding that determinations by Congress regarding ab-
original title were unreviewable under the political question doctrine.
Analysis of these cases strongly draws into question the Court's use of
the doctrine to shield Congress from liability.219 Moreover, the Court's
reliance in Tee-Hit-Ton on the political question doctrine is even more
suspect in light of recent decisions limiting considerably the scope of
the doctrine.220
Finally, analysis of the historical context of the case suggests that
the result in Tee-Hi-Ton was precipitated by fiscal and political con-
siderations. As a consequence, the traditional decisionmaking proce-
dure of the Court was subverted, and the rights of Indians to their
aboriginal lands were narrowed significantly.
The Effect of Tee-Hit-Ton
Although the Tee-Hi-Ton decision is analytically unsound, one
might argue that the rule is uncontroversial today because few cases
remain in which the rule could operate inequitably. One might also
conclude that, even admitting the theoretical inequity of the rule, its
impact on other areas of Indian rights law is negligible. Unfortunately,
362 U.S. 99, 119 (1960) (interpreting 25 U.S.C. § 177 (1976)). Since recognized title has been
determined to be a property right, the absence of a right to alienate freely, being common to
both types of title, cannot be determinative of the characterization of aboriginal title as a
property interest.
Professors Ackerman and Tribe have avoided a definitional approach to determining
property rights or interests, emphasizing instead the need to consider whether, in a particular
case, it is in the public interest to require just compensation. See B. ACKERMAN, PRIVATE
PROPERTY AND THE CONSTITUTION 26-40 (1977); L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW § 9-3, at 459-63 (1978). Considering the various kinds of property interests protected
by the fifth amendment, it appears that a common feature of all protected property is the
owner's reasonable basis for relying on continued ownership. See, e.g., Alamo Land & Cat-
tle Co. v. Arizona, 424 U.S. 295, 303 (1976) (the rights of periodic tenants); Choate v. Trapp,
224 U.S. 665, 677-78 (1912) (tax exemptions); United States v. Welch, 217 U.S. 333, 339.
(19 10) (easements); Swanson v. United States, 156 F.2d 442, 445 (9th Cir. 1946), cert. denied,
329 U.S. 800 (1947) (the rights of mortgagors and mortgagees in lien mortgages); United
States v. 376.21 Acres, 240 F. Supp. 163, 165 (1965) (future interests); United States v. Cer-
tain Lands, 220 F. Supp. 696, 701 (1963) (equitable servitudes). Cf. Acton v. United States,
401 F.2d 896, 899 (9th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1121 (1969) (majority rule recognizes
only vested property rights and not rights under licenses and permits). See generally 2
NICHOLS, supra note 124, at § 5.1[1]-[4]. To the extent that customary use and habit supply
much of the basis for determining whether one's reliance on continued ownership is reason-
able, aboriginal title easily qualifies for status as a property interest. See L. TRIBE, AMERI-
CAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 9-4, at 465 (1978).
219. See notes 182-89 & accompanying text supra.
220. Compare Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962), with Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S.
486 (1969), and Delaware Tribal Business Comm. v. Weeks, 430 U.S. 73 (1977).
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as this portion of the Article demonstrates, Tee-Hit-Ton has had a per-
vasive, continuing effect on litigation involving Indian rights.22' The
impact of Tee-Hit-Ton has been felt most heavily in four areas of In-
dian law. First, and most obvious, Tee-Hit-Ton limited the protection
afforded by the takings clause to land recognized by Congress in a
"treaty or other agreement. ' 222 Since Congress alone can recognize ti-
tle, not all tribes living on reservations carved out from cessions by
treaty or created by executive order have been held to possess recog-
nized title. Second, the deference to congressional power shown in Tee-
Hit-Ton has encouraged lower courts to give an even more expansive
reading to the scope of Congress's authority over Indian lands. For
example, Tee-Hit-Ton now presents both actual and potential obstacles
to derivative claims brought by Indian tribes, i e., claims based on, but
legally separate from, the Indians' claims to aboriginal land. In addi-
tion, Tee-Hit-Ton recently has been relied on to support the authority
of Congress to extinguish retroactively claims based on aboriginal title,
a power never intimated in the opinion.
Taking Claims
The Claims Courts
The immediate impact of the Tee-Hit-Ton rule was felt by both the
Indian Claims Commission and the Court of Claims, the only tribunals
221. Tee-Hit- Ton also has had a dramatic effect on the land claims of other indigeneous
peoples, especially in the British Commonwealth. As several commentators have demon-
strated, Tee-Hit-Ton has inspired courts of other countries to shift their position on aborigi-
nal land rights. In New Zealand, Australia, and British Columbia, for example, a series of
cases protecting Indian land rights, by courts often acknowledging Johnson as persuasively
reasoned, has been followed by a sudden shift to the position that the sovereign has the right
to extinguish aboriginal title by any means and without any duty to pay just compensation.
In each instance the court has cited Tee-Hit-Ton with approval. For discussions of these
trends, see Hookey, The Gove Land Rights Case. 4 Judicial Dispensationfor the Taking of
Aboriginal Lands in Australia?, 5 FED. L. REV. 85, 98-102 (1972) (review of aboriginal land
claims in New Zealand, Africa, Australia, and British Columbia); Mickenberg, Aboriginal
Rights in Canada and the United States, 9 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 119, 135-38 (1971). See also
Smith, The Concept of Native Title, 24 U. TORONTO L.J. 1 (1974). Indeed, until recently,
some of the sternest criticisms of Tee-Hit-Ton were made in the law journals of common-
wealth countries. Professor Hookey called Tee-Hit-Ton a "spectre that was partly semantic
and partly racial." The rule was a "surprising finding made in the course of following rather
than, as might have been supposed, overruling Johnson." Hookey, The Gove Land Rights
Case. A Judicial Dispensationfor the Taking f Aboriginal Lands in Australia?, 5 FED. L.
REV. 85, 99, 101 (1972). Professor Mickenberg's criticism was even more scathing. The case
was a "perfidious rationalization for the outright theft of private property by the United
States Government." Mickenberg, Aboriginal Rights in Canada and the United States, 9 Os-
GOODE HALL L.J. 119, 136 (1971).
222. 348 U.S. at 277.
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in which a tribe could present a claim for money damages against the
government. To appreciate Tee-Hit-Ton-s effect on the claims courts, it
is necessary to understand their jurisdiction over Indian claims. Before
1946, Indian tribes were barred from suing the United States for dam-
ages unless they were able to secure the passage of a special jurisdic-
tional act waiving sovereign immunity and granting jurisdiction to the
Court of Claims.223 This expensive,224 cumbersome,225 and often un-
fair procedure ended with the passage of the Indian Claims Commis-
sion Act (Claims Act) in 1946,226 which was designed to compensate
the Indians for injuries caused by the United States government. The
Claims Act distinguished between claims accruing before 1946, thought
to present the most complex problems, and claims arising after 1946.
The pre-1946 claims, some of which were a century old, were adjudi-
cable before a special five-person commission,227 the Indian Claims
Commission, only if they fell into one or more of five broad classes of
223. 1942 HANDBOOK, supra note 84, at 373-78. See also THE LEGAL CONSCIENCE,
supra note 108, at 269-72; Wilkinson, supra note 90, at 511-17. Tribes could not sue the
Government because when Congress created the Court of Claims in 1863, it expressly re-
moved from its jurisdiction claims for money damages "growing out of or dependent on any
treaty stipulation entered into with foreign nations or with the Indian tribes." Act of Mar. 3,
1863, ch. 92, § 9, 12 Stat. 765, 767. As a result, a tribe wishing to redress a grievance was
forced to petition Congress. The Claims Act removed this nearly insurmountable barrier.
See note 226 & accompanying text infra. Over 800 claims were filed in the five year period
that the tribes were given to present all past claims against the government, in contrast to the
142 claims adjudicated in the period between 1881 and 1946. See Wilkinson, supra note 90,
at 512.
224. See V. DELORIA, BEHIND THE TRAIL OF BROKEN TREATIES 217-20 (1974) [herein-
after cited as BROKEN TREATIES].
225. See 1942 HANDBOOK, supra note 84, at 373. The Sioux Nation's attempt to get
compensation for the confiscation of the Black Hills is an example. The tribe first sued
under a jurisdictional act passed in 1920. In 1942, the Court of Claims ruled that the act did
not grant jurisdiction to consider a fifth amendment taking claim. Sioux Tribe v. United
States, 97 Ct. Cl. 613, 666 (1942), cert. denied, 318 U.S. 789 (1943). After the Indian Claims
Commission Act was enacted, the Sioux resubmitted their claim to the newly created com-
mission. A decision was finally reached in 1980. Sioux Nation v. United States, 48
U.S.L.W. 4960 (1980).
226. Indian Claims Commission Act of 1946, ch. 959, 60 Stat. 1049 (codified at 25
U.S.C. §§ 70 to 70v-3 (1976 & Supp. 11 1978); 28 U.S.C. § 1505 (1976)).
227. Congress had expected the older claims to be the most difficult and time-consuming
to prove, requiring the testimony of historians and anthropologists. It determined that these
claims could be most efficiently settled by a commission charged only with this task and thus
able to develop the expertise needed to resolve the claims efficiently. Indeed, Congress origi-
nally viewed the five-member commission as an advisory body only, designed to find facts
and determine whether or not a tribe had a right to compensation in a non-adversary pro-
ceeding. The Commission soon adopted the adversary model, however, and evolved into a
judicial tribunal. See Vance, The Congressional Mandate and the Indian Claims Commis-
sion, 45 N.D. L. REV. 325, 326-35 (1969).
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claims. 228 Three of the five classes created by the Claims Act could be
applied to a land claim: clause 1, for claims based on the Constitution;
clause 3, for claims involving treaties; and clause 4, for claims that land
"owned or occupied" by Indians had been taken.229 The Court of
Claims was given appellate jurisdiction over the Commission, with fur-
ther opportunity for review by the Supreme Court on a writ of certio-
rari.230 Claims arising after 1946, in contrast, could be maintained by
Indian tribes only on the same legal and equitable theories available to
non-Indians.2 3'
Shortly after Tee-Hit-Ton was decided, the government argued
that the three relevant land claims under the Claims Act, passed nine
years before Tee-Hit-Ton, had been intended to relate only to claims
based on title recognized in the Tee-Hit-Ton sense. Under this inter-
pretation, many tribes would be prevented from recovering anything
for either unjust land transactions or absolute confiscations of their ab-
original land. Fortunately, the argument was rejected in Oloe & Mis-
souria Tribe v. United States,232 thereby mitigating Tee-Hit-Ton's effect
228. 25 U.S.C. § 70a (1976). The tribes were given five years within which to file all
claims or lose them forever. Id. § 70k. The Commission divided up the 370 broad claims
filed by the tribes into more than 600 dockets, one for each separate claim. UNITED STATES
INDIAN CLAIMS COMMISSION, FINAL REPORT 5 (1978).
229. 25 U.S.C. § 70a (1976).
230. Id. § 70s.
231. 28 U.S.C. § 1505 (1976). Originally the Commission was to have concluded its
work by 1956. Act of Aug. 13, 1946, ch. 959, § 23, 60 Stat. 1049. After granting four exten-
sions, Congress finally ordered it to complete its work by the end of fiscal year 1978. 25
U.S.C. § 70v (1976). See UNITED STATES INDIAN CLAIMS COMMISSION, FINAL REPORT 16-
20 (1978); Vance, The Congressional Mandate and the Indian Claims Commission, 45 N.D. L.
REV. 325 (1969). On January 1, 1978, the Commission transferred the remaining cases, com-
prising 102 dockets, to the Court of Claims. As of September, 1978, 68 of these cases had not
been disposed of. INDIAN CLAIMS COMMISSION, FINAL REPORT 20 (1978).
232. 131 F. Supp. 265 (Ct. Cl.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 848 (1955) (treaty revision and
breach of fair and honorable dealing claims). The Government had based one of its argu-
ments on the assumption that the Congress of 1946 had been cognizant of the distinction
between recognized and aboriginal title. The argument presented was that clauses 3 (treaty
revision), 4 (takings), and 5 (fair and honorable dealings) were intended to provide only for
recovery for loss of recognized title, because Congress deliberately omitted the term "Indian
title" from the provisions. Id. at 271-72, 275. The court stated that one just as easily could
argue that the omissions of the term "recognized title" meant Congress only intended to
provide for recovery for the loss of aboriginal land. Id. at 271-72. In addition, the court
observed that Congress did not always differentiate between recognized and aboriginal title
in treaties, often only referring to "Indian land." Id. Of course, this reasoning opposes
Justice Reed's arguments on recognition in Tee-Hit-Ton. There was ample evidence, how-
ever, of congressional intent to support the court's conclusion that Congress intended to
provide a remedy for the loss of all Indian land, whether title was aboriginal, recognized, or
even fee simple absolute. Id. at 272-85. The court thus upheld the Commission's determi-
nation that the government was liable under the treaty revision clause for aboriginal land
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on Claims Act cases. Therefore, although Tee-Hit-Ton prevents recov-
ery for a taking of aboriginal land occurring after 1946, a tribe whose
land had been confiscated before 1946 has a claim under the Claims
Act for the land's fair market value at the time of taking, despite the
lack of recognized title.233 Only a tribe holding recognized title could
recover the measure of damages for a fifth amendment taking, how-
ever, which includes an amount for interest from the time of taking to
the time of award.234 Nonetheless, tribes have recovered substantial
damages under clause 4 for a taking of aboriginal title.235
Executive Order Reservations
Tee-Hit-Ton established that only recognition by Congress results
in recognized title.2 36 Although several presidents have created reser-
vations by executive order,237 these reservations are not protected
against confiscation unless Congress subsequently has recognized the
sold for an unconscionable consideration. Although Otoe & Missouria was not a clause 4
takings claim, the court stressed in dicta that the reference in clause 4 to land "owned" or
"occupied" demonstrated an intent to provide a recovery for taking of aboriginal title. Id. at
276. The court's dicta contradicts somewhat the earlier argument based on Congress's fail-
ure to differentiate between the two types of title. If Congress had been aware of the distinc-
tion, however, it clearly would have omitted land "owned" by Indian tribes from clause 4,
since such land was covered under clause I, covering constitutional claims, but the Congress
in 1946 was still doubtful whether any kind of Indian title was protected from confiscation,
and thus included the words "owned and occupied" to make clear the intent to grant recov-
ery for takings, even if they were not covered by the Constitution.
233. 131 F. Supp. at 291 (construing United States v. Alcea Band of Tillamooks, 341
U.S. 48 (1951) (per curiam) (recovery at market value, not "subsistence" value of the land to
the tribe).
234. See United States v. Creek Nation, 295 U.S. 103, 111-12 (1935). Because some
claims were over one hundred years old, the interest amount could be much greater than the
value of the land at the time of taking. See Sioux Tribe v. United States, 48 U.S.L.W. 4960
(1980).
235. See, e.g., Kiowa, Comanche & Apache Tribes v. United States, 34 Ind. Cl. Comm.
263 (1974) (compromise agreement of $35,060,000 for taking of aboriginal land); Thompson
v. United States, 13 Ind. Cl. Comm. 513 (1964) ($29,100,000 compromise agreement for
taking aboriginal land in California); Jicarilla Apache Tribe v. United States, 12 Ind. Cl.
Comm. 470 (1963) (separate opinion), 25 Ind. Cl. Comm. 248 (1971) (final award of
$9,150,000).
236. 348 U.S. at 277-78.
237. Congress ended the treaty making era in 1871. 1942 HANDBOOK, supra note 84, at
66-67. Before this time, however, presidents had created and enlarged reservations by exec-
utive orders removing land from the public domain. Originally attacked as an unconstitu-
tional infringement of the plenary power of Congress over Indian affairs, the president's
power was held valid, first upon a theory of implied delegation by Congress, Mason v.
United States, 260 U.S. 545 (1923), and later by express delegation. General Allotment Act
of 1887, ch. 119, § 1, 24 Stat. 388. In 1919, the practice was outlawed by Congress. Act of
June 30, 1919, ch. 4, § 27, 41 Stat. 34 (current version codified at 43 U.S.C. § 150 (1976)).
See 1942 HANDBOOK, Supra note 84, at 299-300.
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tribe's right to the land. Some executive order land has been recog-
nized explicitly by Congress, most notably Najavo and Hopi land,238
but over 2,000,000 acres of unrecognized executive order land existed
as of 1953,239 the last date for which any figures are available. These
two million acres of Indian reservation conceivably could be confis-
cated by congressional fiat under the rule in Tee-Hit-Ton without com-
pensation to the occupants. 240
The only Supreme Court cases that have considered the compen-
sability of takings of executive order reservations are Sioux Tribe v.
United States241 and Confederated Bands of Ute Indians v. United
States,2 42 both of which were decided before Tee-Hit-Ton. In both
cases, the Court held that the tribes did not have compensable rights in
executive order reservations that were subsequently restored to the
public domain. 243 In addition, Hynes v. Grimes Packing244 decided im-
mediately before Tee-Hit-Ton, suggested in dicta that executive orders
creating reservations did not confer compensable property rights.
245
The holdings of Sioux Tribe and Confederated Utes are questiona-
ble precedent. Both were decided when the importance of recognized
title was unknown and both involved reservations not intended as a
permanent home for the tribal members. The surrounding circum-
stances in Sioux Tribe indicated that the President only intended to
create a temporary buffer zone to keep liquor traffic away from the
Great Sioux reservation.246 In Confederated Utes the President had set
aside additional land to effectuate the purpose of a previous treaty.
247
The tribes in both cases had other extensive land holdings. Thus, the
238. See Fort Berthold Reservation v. United States, 390 F.2d 686 (Ct. Cl. 1968); Seka-
quaptewa v. MacDonald, 448 F. Supp. 1183 (D. Ariz. 1978) (construing Act of June 14,
1934, ch. 521, 48 Stat. 960) (9,000,000 acres on Navajo reservation explicitly recognized by
statute); Healing v. Jones, 174 F. Supp. 211 (D. Ariz. 1959), a f'd, 373 U.S. 758 (1963) (con-
struing Act of July 22, 1958, 72 Stat. 402) (jurisdictional act recognized Hopi or Navajo had
vested right in disputed joint use area).
239. See Note, Tribal Property Interests in Executive- Order Reservations" A Compensable
Indian Right, 69 YALE L.J. 627, 629 n.14 (1960).
240. Id
241. 316 U.S. 317 (1942).
242. 330 U.S. 169 (1947).
243. Confederated Bands of Ute Indians v. United States, 330 U.S. 169, 176-77 (1947);
Sioux Tribe v. United States, 316 U.S. 317, 329-30 (1942).
244. 337 U.S. 86 (1949).
245. Id. at 103. Hynes dealt with the authority of the Secretary of the Interior to bar
non-Indians from fishing within 3,000 feet of an executive order reservation.
246. 316 U.S. at 319-22.
247. 330 U.S. at 172-73.
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comparatively small executive order land which was taken away may
not have appeared to the Court such a harsh loss.
The potentially severe effects of Tee-Hit-Ton on tribes seeking re-
covery for takings of executive order land under the fifth amendment
have been mitigated somewhat by the Court of Claims. The court, in
addressing pre-1946 takings of executive order land, has held that such
takings are covered by clause 4 of the Claims Act, which creates a
claim for takings "arising under . . .Executive Orders of the presi-
dent." 248 Therefore, only the post-1946 claims are subject to the rule in
Tee-Hit-Ton. Accordingly, if the government were to confiscate reser-
vation land created by executive order after 1946, the tribe would have
to prove that Congress recognized its right to live on the reservation
permanently. In such a case, the broad language of Sioux Tribe and
Confederated Utes249 might prevent recovery. It is hoped, however,
that courts will view the circumstances of each case broadly and find
implied, if not express, recognition by Congress of the Indians' inter-
est.250
Reservations Created by Treaty
Although Tee-Hit-Ton requires congressional recognition of ab-
original title by treaty, merely because a tribe bases its claim on the
existence of a treaty is not dispositive because not all treaties have been
248. Fort Berthold Reservation v. United States, 390 F.2d 686, 696-97 (Ct. C1. 1968).
249. Sioux Tribe, Confederated Utes, and the dicta in Hynes were cited with approval in
three lower court cases, although they did not influence the outcome of the lower court
decisions. See United States v. Southern Pac. Trans. Co., 543 F.2d 676, 687 (9th Cir. 1976)
(action seeking declaratory judgment that tribe, not railroad, owned portion of executive
order reservation and damages for trespass; held for tribe); Sekaquaptewa v. MacDonald,
448 F. Supp. 1183, 1189, 1191 (D. Ariz. 1978) (executive order reservation recognized by
Congress); Healing v. Jones, 174 F. Supp. 211, 216 (D. Ariz. 1959) (same).
250. The equities are strong in this area, for many executive order reservations were
created for friendly tribes who had no treaties with the United States because they never had
warred with the government. See, e.g., Gila River Pima-Maricopa Indian Community v.
United States, 494 F.2d 1386, 1388 (1974). One Note argued that a 1927 federal law regard-
ing oil and gas leases was intended to recognize all executive order Indian land. Note, Tribal
Properly Interests in Executive-Order Reservations: A Compensable Indian Right, 69 YALE
L.J. 627, 631-39 (1960). The author pointed to extensive legislative history demonstrating an
intent to give all the royalties derived from oil and gas on executive order reservations to
tribes occupying these reservations. Unfortunately, the language relied on by the author
only indicated an intent to guarantee to the tribes an equitable interest in the land against
third parties, the same interest a tribe owning purely aboriginal land would have had. See,
e.g., United States v. Shoshone Tribe, 304 U.S. 111, 117 (1938). The author's contentions
were rejected in a recent decision. See Sekaquaptewa v. MacDonald, 448 F. Supp. 1183,
1192-93 (D. Ariz. 1978).
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construed as recognizing title.25' Precedent as to what constitutes rec-
ognition in the Tee-Hit-Ton sense is confusing and fails to give ade-
quate guidance to courts considering tribal claims. An analysis of the
decisions shows that three periods-the years before Tee-Hit-Ton, the
fifteen years following the decision and the decade of the 1970's-ex-
hibit distinct and conflicting trends that account for much of this confu-
sion.
Before Tee-Hit-Ton, the claims courts did not distinguish between
recognized and aboriginal title. The term "recognized" was used by the
courts to denote only that the federal government had acknowledged
that the tribe actually used and occupied aboriginal land at the relevant
time.252 This freed the tribe from having to prove that it actually and
exclusively occupied the land,253 a time-consuming and expensive proc-
ess in which the tribe was not always successful.254 When courts subse-
quently began to use the term "recognition" in the Tee-Hit-Ton sense,
the previous cases were not distinguished.255 Consequently, pre-Tee-
251. See notes 265-73 & accompanying text, infra.
252. See, e.g., Miami Tribe of Oklahoma v. United States, 2 Ind. Cl. Comm. 617, 640-43
(1954), remanded on other grounds, 175 F. Supp. 926 (Ct. Cl. 1959); Quapaw Tribe v. United
States, 1 Ind. Cl. Comm. 474, 491 (1951), alrd, 120 F. Supp. 283 (Ct. Cl. 1954); Pawnee
Indian Tribe of Oklahoma v. United States, 1 Ind. Cl. Comm. 245. 265, 281 (1950), re-
manded on other grounds, 301 F.2d 667 (Ct. Cl.), cert. denied, 301 U.S. 918 (1962). In Qua-
paw Tribe, for example, the term "recognition" was not used in describing the process of
creation of a reservation. In determining whether the reservation had been recognized, the
Commission did not look to the congressional language in the treaty itself, which merely
described the boundaries of the reservation, but focused instead on instructions given to the
treaty commissioner by John C. Calhoun, then Secretary of War. I Ind. Cl. Comm. at 489-
90. The Commission held that the facts amounted to "a recognition of aboriginal possessory
title in those Indians," because the treaty "was a confirmation of the original title to the
Indians to the reserved lands." Id. at 491-92. For the elements necessary to prove aborigi-
nal title, see Pawnee Indian Tribe of Oklahoma v. United States, 1 Ind. Cl. Comm. 245, 258-
62 (1950), rev'd in part on other grounds, 301 F. Supp. 667 (Ct. Cl. 1962).
253. See generally Annot., 41 A.L.R. FED. 425 (1979).
254. See, e.g., Strong v. United States, 518 F.2d 556 (Ct. Cl.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1015
(1975) (use not exclusive); Red Lake, Pembina & White Earth Bands v. United States, 164
Ct. Cl. 389 (1964) (not exclusive occupancy); Quapaw Tribe v. United States, 120 F. Supp.
283 (Ct. Cl. 1954) (failure of proof as to exclusive use).
255. Compare, e.g., Miami Tribe of Oklahoma v. United States, 2 Ind. Cl. Comm. 617
(1954) (opinion of the Commission), with Miami Tribe of Oklahoma v. United States, 175 F.
Supp. 926 (Ct. Cl. 1959) (affirmance in pertinent part by Court of Claims). The Commis-
sion's opinion, written prior to Tee-Hit-Ton, used the terms "recognized" and "acknowl-
edged" interchangeably. 2 Ind. Cl. Comm. at 639. Moreover, the definition given
"recognized" was much broader than the Tee-Hit-Ton definition, one that would be conso-
nant with the idea of acknowledgment of boundaries. For instance, the Commission stated
that recognition "may appear in pronouncements and conduct of responsible government
officials," a proposition at odds with Tee-Hit-Ton's requirement of an explicit congressional
grant of land. Compare Miami Tribe of Oklahoma v. United States, 2 Ind. Cl. Comm. at
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Hit-Ton cases are a poor source of precedent for an attorney seeking to
establish that a tribe holds recognized title as a compensable property
right, even if the treaty in question is identical to one involved in a
prior case.256
It was not until the late 1950's and 1960's that the Commission and
the Court of Claims began to develop consistent case law on what con-
stituted recognition in the Tee-Hit-Ton sense. During this period, the
claims courts began to require more than an acknowledgement of
boundaries, 257 which seems to have been the sole requirement in the
early cases.258 The most significant case of this era was Miami Tribe of
Oklahoma v. United States.259 The Court of Claims, in upholding the
Commission's decision that the claimant held recognized title, stressed
that a treaty or statute need only promise the tribe a permanent home
to meet the Tee-Hit-Ton test: "Where Congress has by treaty or statute
conferred upon the Indians or acknowledged in the Indians the right to
permanently occupy and use land, then the Indians have a right or title
to that land which has been variously referred to in court decisions as
'treaty title,' 'reservation title,' 'recognized title,' and 'acknowledged ti-
tle.' "260
During this period, the claims courts were fairly liberal in constru-
ing congressional action as having recognized title in the Indians. In
some instances treaty language explicitly promised that land would be
set aside "for. .. permanent settlement and occupation 261 or other-
wise clearly acknowledged the Indians as permanent owners of the
land.262 In other instances, less explicit language, often not involving
640, with Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States, 348 U.S. 272, 277-78 (1955). In contrast, the
Court of Claims, while treating the issue of recognition as relevant only to excuse the tribe
from having to prove exclusive use and occupancy, applied the standards for recognition
from Tee-Hit-Ton. 175 F. Supp. at 928, 936.
256. See Annot., 41 A.L.R. FED. 425, 448 n.33 (1979).
257. In Sac & Fox Tribe v. United States, 315 F.2d 896 (Ct. C1. 1963), the Court of
Claims stated that "[mI]ere executive recognition is insufficient, as is a simple acknowledge-
ment that Indians physically lived in a certain region. There must be an intention to accord
or recognize a legal interest in the land." Id. at 897.
258. See note 255 & accompanying text supra.
259. 175 F. Supp. 926 (Ct. C1. 1959).
260. Id. at 936 (citing Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States, 348 U.S. 272 (1955)).
261. See, e.g., Uintah & White River Bands of Ute Indians v. United States, 152 F.
Supp. 953, 955 (Ct. Cl. 1957) (special jurisdictional act held to include fifth amendment
taking of recognized title land).
262. See, e.g., Miami Tribe of Oklahoma v. United States, 175 F. Supp. 926, 931, 940
(Ct. Cl. 1959) (Treaty of Greenville gave the right to occupy "as long as they please" without
interference); United States v. Kickapoo Tribe, 174 Ct. Cl. 550, 533 (1966) (Treaty of
Grouseland stated that "the United States does hereby engage to consider them as joint
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terms associated with the granting of land, were construed by the court
as recognizing Indian title.263 The courts also construed treaties in
which tribes acknowledged their own boundaries in relation to the
boundaries of neighboring tribes as treaties of recognition in the Tee-
Hit-Ton sense.264
The 1970's, however, marked a shift away from the liberal con-
struction of the prior decade.265 In United States v. Kiowa, Comanche &
Apache Tribes,266 for example, the tribes argued that an 1865 treaty
had recognized title to their land, later ceded for an unconscionably
low consideration in an 1867 treaty. The 1865 treaty stated in part:
The United States hereby agree that the district of country em-
braced within the following limits, or such portion of the same as
may hereafter from time to time be designated by the President of
the United States for that purpose . ..shall be and is hereby set
apart for the absolute and undisturbed use and occupation of the tribes
who areparties to this treaty, and of such other friendly tribes as have
heretofore resided within said limits, or as they may from time to
time agree to admit among them . . . . The Indians . ..expressly
agree to remove to and accept as theirpermanent home the country.267
Despite the language regarding permanency, treated in Miami Tribe as
determinative, 268 the Court of Claims overruled the Commission's
owners of all the country. . . [and] will not purchase any part of the said country without
the consent of each of the said tribes").
263. See Oneida Tribe v. United States, 165 Ct. Cl. 487, 491, cert. denied, 379 U.S. 946
(1964). Oneida illustrates the doctrinal confusion created by Tee-Hit-Ton. The Court of
Claims relied on two cases decided before Tee-Hit-Ton in which tribes had been compen-
sated for takings of land reserved by similar treaty language: United States v. Klamath &
Moadoc Tribes, 304 U.S. 119, 122-23 (1938) ("held and regarded as an Indian reservation"),
and Menominee Tribe v. United States, 101 Ct. Cl. 22 (1944) ("held as Indian lands are
held"). Although neither case discussed the notion of recognition, the court felt bound by
both cases, apparently on the theory that since each tribe had been compensated as for a
fifth amendment taking, their title must have been recognized in the Tee-Hit-Ton sense.
264. See, e.g., Crow Tribe v. United States, 284 F.2d 361, 364, 367 (Ct. Cl. 1960), cert.
denied, 366 U.S. 924 (1961). In Minnesota Chippewa Tribe v. United States, 315 F.2d 906
(Ct. C1. 1963), a series of treaties, beginning with the Treaty of Prairie du Chien and culmi-
nating in an 1854 treaty, led the court to conclude that the entire sequence of treaties taken
together constituted recognition in the Tee-Hit-Ton sense. Id. at 908-11.
265. This change may have been influenced by an earlier series of dissents by Judges
Whitaker and Jones. See, e.g., Minnesota Chippewa Tribe v. United States, 315 F.2d 906,
914 (Ct. Cl. 1963) (Whitaker & Jones, JJ., dissenting); Crow Tribe v. United States, 284 F.2d
361, 374 (Ct. Cl. 1960) (Whitaker & Jones, JJ., dissenting), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 924 (1961);
Miami Tribe of Oklahoma v. United States, 175 F. Supp. 926, 957 (Ct. Cl. 1959) (Whitaker
& Jones, JJ., dissenting).
266. 479 F.2d 1369 (Ct. Cl. 1973), cert. denied sub nom. Wichita Indian Tribe v. United
States, 416 U.S. 936 (1974).
267. Treaty of Oct. 18, 1865, art. II, 14 Stat. 717, 718.
268. See text accompanying note 260 supra.
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holding that the treaty recognized title.269 The court gave little weight
to the rule of liberal construction of treaties with Indian tribes.270
Rather, the court concluded that because the area granted was "subject
to redefinition and diminution at the will of the President," Congress
had not intended to recognize title.271
Subsequently, in Strong v. United States,272 the court, without dis-
cussing the language of the relevant treaties, held that title had not
been recognized because extrinsic evidence revealed an intent on the
part of the government to rid the area of Indians. The Court, in a man-
ner analogous to Tee-Hit-Ton, disregarded both the general course of
conduct between the Indian tribes and the government and the specific
language of the treaty. Considering relevant only the intent of Con-
gress to take the land away, the Court noted that although the govern-
ment had negotiated with the Indians for cessions, the negotiations
were a sham, thus justifying the Commission's conclusion that the in-
tent of the government was "unequivocally the opposite of what is re-
quired to establish recognized title. 273 Strong thus subverted the
principles of treaty interpretation followed by previous cases.
The inconsistent results in these cases demonstrate the failings of
the distinction created in Tee-Hit-Ton. The inability of that distinction
to withstand analytic scrutiny has meant that courts confronted with
the issue of recognition have had little guidance in making their deci-
sions. As a consequence, even a tribe fortunate enough to possess a
ratified treaty with the United States does not necessarily acquire rec-
ognized title.274 Additionally, a tribe found to have recognized Indian
269. 479 F.2d at 1373-76.
270. See, e.g., Peoria Tribe v. United States, 390 U.S. 468,472-73 (1968) (quoting Peoria
Tribe v. United States, 369 F.2d 1001, 1006-07 (Ct. Cl. 1966)); United States v. Shoshone
Tribe, 304 U.S. 111, 116 (1938); Jones v. Meehan, 175 U.S. 1, 10-12 (1889). See also 1942
HANDBOOK, supra note 79, at 37-38; Wilkinson & Volkmar, JudicialReview of Indian Treaty
Abrogation, 63 CALIF. L. REv. 601, 617-20 (1975).
271. 479 F.2d at 1373. If the court had followed the reasoning of Oneida Tribe, dis-
cussed note 263 supra, it would have held the title recognized, following the Supreme
Court's 1938 decision in United States v. Klamath & Moadoc Tribes, 304 U.S. 119 (1938).
The tribe in Klamath & Moadoc Tribes had been compensated for a fifth amendment taking
even though the reservation was subject to redefinition by the president. Id. at 121-22 (con-
struing Treaty with the Klamath & Moadoc Tribes, Oct. 18, 1864, 16 Stat. 707, 708) (land to
be set aside "until otherwise directed by the President").
272. 518 F.2d 556 (Ct. Cl. 1975).
273. Id. at 564 (quoting Strong v. United States, 31 Ind. Cl. Comm. 99, 107 (1973)).
274. See, e.g., Strong v. United States, 518 F.2d 556 (Ct. Cl. 1975); Sac & Fox Tribe v.
United States, 315 F.2d 896 (Ct. Cl. 1963).
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title from a treaty in a pre-Tee-Hit-Ton case has no assurance the treaty
will be held to grant recognized title in the Tee-Hit-Ton sense.275
Tee-Hit-Ton and the Lone Wolf Doctrine
Although the Court in Tee-Hit-Ton may have wanted to avoid a
rule requiring compensation for the taking of aboriginal land, a rule
denying compensation for a taking of any Indian land would have been
morally and politically unacceptable, especially in light of the solemn
promises made in many Indian treaties. As Justice Black was to say
later: "Great nations, like great men, should keep their word. ' 276 In
many ways, this statement reflects the genius of Justice Reed's charac-
terization of recognized title as a more protected type of Indian owner-
ship; in expressly denying aboriginal land fifth amendment protection,
Tee-Hit-Ton implicitly affirmed solemn treaty promises to protect Indi-
ans' occupancy of their retained reservation land.
Nonetheless, judicial deference to congressional authority has its
limits, particularly when the actions of Congress infringe upon consti-
tutional rights.277 Tee-Hit-Ton, however, may have inadvertently fur-
nished Congress with a justification for such unconstitutional activity.
Considered alone, Tee-Hit-Ton's distinction between aboriginal and
recognized title appears to result in at least recognized title being pro-
tected under the fifth amendment. But, considered in conjunction with
other cases, even this minimal protection may not be afforded, thereby
leaving both aboriginal and recognized title unprotected from fifth
amendment confiscations. In the recent case of Sioux Nations v. United
States,278 the government advanced such a claim, based on Lone Wolf
P. Hitchcock,279 a 1903 case most frequently cited for the proposition
that Congress may unilaterally abrogate Indian treaties, as it can abro-
275. See Quapaw Tribe v. United States, 120 F. Supp. 283, 286 (Ct. Cl. 1954) (court
assumed existence of treaty had an impact on amount of compensation; no holding on rec-
ognition). The tribe also may not be able to rely on collateral estoppel, because in a separate
claim between the same parties, collateral estoppel attaches only to an issue actually litigated
and necessary to the decision. See Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 326 n.5
(1979). The government could argue that the pre-Tee-Hit-Ton case was decided on the as-
sumption that there was only one kind of title and that the only determination made was
with respect to acknowledgment. Therefore, the issue as to whether title had been recog-
nized in the Tee-Hit-Ton sense had never been raised, litigated, and adjudicated.
276. FPC v. Tuscarora Indian Nation, 362 U.S. 99, 142 (1960) (Black, J., dissenting).
277. Cf Delaware Tribal Business Comm. v. Weeks, 430 U.S. 73, 83-85 (1977) (judicial
review appropriate to determine whether a congressional scheme of distribution to tribe
members violated equal protection component of fifth amendment).
278. 48 U.S.L.W. 4960 (1980).
279. 187 U.S. 553 (1903). Lone Wo/fhas the dubious distinction of having been referred
to as "the Indian's DredScott decision." Sioux Nation v. United States, 601 F.2d 1157, 1173
(Ct. Cl. 1979) (Nichols, J., concurring), a ffd, 48 U.S.L.W. 4960 (1980).
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gate any treaty with a foreign nation.280 The government argued in
Sioux Nation that Congress has virtually unreviewable power 28' to dis-
pose of even recognized title, as long as Congress acts in the best inter-
ests of the tribes.282
In Lone Wof the Supreme Court held that Congress could abro-
gate the provisions of an Indian treaty by passing a law in conflict with
the treaty.2 3 If the fifth amendment required compensation upon ex-
tinguishment of aboriginal title, the Lone Wo/f doctrine would present
no obstacle to cases involving congressional abrogation of a treaty rec-
ognizing tribal title to land; the tribe could still receive compensation
for the government's taking of aboriginal title. But because Tee-Hit-
Ton does not require compensation for the extinguishment of purely
aboriginal title and because Lone Woff authorizes the abrogation of
treaties, even those recognizing title, the two cases in conjunction
formed the basis of the government's arguments in Sioux Nation that
congressional action in Indian land compensation cases was a political
280. See, e.g., 1942 HANDBOOK, supra note 84, at 34-35. Lone Wolf was directly on
point in Sioux Nation because the tribes in each case alleged a government breach of identi-
cal treaty language. Compare Treaty with the Sioux at Fort Laramie, April 29, 1868, art.
XII, 15 Stat. 635, 639 with Treaty with the Kiowas & Commanches at Medicine Lodge, Oct.
21, 1867, art. XII, 15 Stat. 581, 585.
281. Brief for United States at 57-59 & n.49, United States v. Sioux Nation, 48 U.S.L.W.
4960 (1980) (urging court to apply minimal rationality standard of Williamson v. Lee Opti-
cal, 348 U.S. 485 (1955)). See note 284 & accompanying text infra.
282. Id. at 52-57. The Court of Claims in Sioux Nation had rejected the government's
argument, holding that Lone Wo/f addressed only the issue of the Court's power to enjoin
the enforcement of a statute appropriating Indian lands and not whether the taking would
be compensable under the fifth amendment. The majority thus awarded the tribe over
$1,000,000 in damages. 601 F.2d 1157, 1169-70 (Ct. Cl. 1979). Both the concurring and
dissenting judges argued that Lone Wo/fhad involved a fifth amendment taking. Compare
id. at 1173-74 (Nichols, J., concurring) with id. at 1176-77 (Bennett & Kunzig, JJ., dissent-
ing). The Supreme Court in affirming found that a fifth amendment taking had in fact
occurred. 48 U.S.L.W. at 4974. See note 284 & accompanying text infra.
283. 187 U.S. at 566. Lone Wofinvolved a suit by a tribe, whose land would be re-
garded as treaty-recognized under the rule for recognition in Tee-Hit-Ton, to enjoin a survey
of land ceded by fewer than three-fourths of the adult male members of the tribe in violation
of the Treaty of Medicine Lodge. 15 Stat 581, 582 ("set apart for the absolute and undis-
turbed use and occupation of the tribes"). The Court of Claims later stated that the
Medicine Lodge treaty had recognized title to the land reserved in that treaty. United States
v. Kiowa, Comanche & Apache Tribes, 163 F. Supp. 603, 606 (Ct. Cl. 1958), a f'g 1 Id. Cl.
Comm. 528 (1951) (liability decisions); cf. United States v. Kiowa, Comanche & Apache
Tribes, 479 F.2d 1369, 1375 (Ct. Cl. 1973) (dicta).
Justice Reed did not rely on Lone Wolf in Tee-Hit-Ton, although it contained much
language favorable to his views. For example, Lone Wofdistinguished several "sacred-as-
fee-simple" cases by pointing out that none of them involved a direct challenge to the sover-
eign's power to administer property of the Indians. .d. at 564-65.
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question not subject to judicial review and that recognized title abro-
gated pursuant to such congressional action was not compensable
under the fifth amendment.
The Supreme Court's decision in Sioux Nation rejected the gov-
ernment argument on the reach of governmental power by formulating
a standard of judicial review over the government's action in disposing
of recognized title land. The Court provided that a loss of recognized
title land would not be regarded as a taking only where Congress
makes a good faith attempt to provide the Indian ward with property
that is equivalent to the last recognized title land.284 Although the stan-
dard set forth by the Supreme Court in Sioux Nation for ascertaining
when a taking has occurred relies on Lone Wolf to formulate a different
rule in Indian confiscation cases than is used when non-Indian land is
taken by eminent domain, the Court's rejection of the government's
position that congressional power over Indian land is not subject to
judicial review nonetheless is to be applauded.
The decision in Sioux Nation indicates the Supreme Court would
reject any future arguments by the government that it may break a
treaty of recognition with impunity. Whatever the effect of Sioux Na-
tion on future land claims involving recognized title, the government's
argument in Sioux Nation was not unusual in its use of Tee-Hit-Ton as
exemplifying the extent of congressional power over Indians.2 85 For
example, a federal court recently reasoned that Tee-Hit-Ton gave Con-
284. United States v. Sioux Nation, 48 U.S.L.W. 4960 (1980). The Court rejected the
Court of Claims' analysis that had distinguished Lone Wolf because it had involved an
injunction. See note 283 supra. Instead, the Court disapproved the portion of Lone Wolf
which characterized congressional actions in confiscation cases as a political question, stat-
ing that an earlier case had "discredited that view in taking cases." Id. at 4972 (citing
Deleware Tribal Bus. Comm. v. Weeks, 430 U.S. 73, 84 (1977)).
The Court of Claims had relied on the Fort Berthold good faith rule in developing a
standard for determining when a confiscation of Indian land is a taking. See Fort Berthold
Reservation v. United States, 390 F.2d 686 (Ct. C1. 1968). For a criticism of Berthold, see
Friedman, Interest on Indian Claims.- Judicial Protection ofthe Fisc, 5 VAL. U.L. REV. 26
(1970). The Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Claims, but arguably narrowed the good
faith rule by stressing that the courts must look to adequacy of consideration and by reduc-
ing the importance of the government's subjective good faith in confiscation cases. See 48
U.S.L.W. 4972-73 n.30.
285. Sioux Tribe does not limit the application of this argument except in cases involv-
ing recognized title. "The principles ... set forth . . . are applicable only to instances in
which 'Congress by treaty or other agreement has disclared that thereafter Indians were to
hold the lands permanently.'" 48 U.S.L.W. at 4972 n.29 (quoting Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v.
United States, 348 U.S. 272, 277 (1955)). The Court expressly reaffirmed the continued va-
lidity of Tee-Hit-Ton in "unrecognized" and "aboriginal" title cases. 48 U.S.L.W. at 4972
n.29.
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gress the power to extinguish accrued tort claims by retroactively extin-
guishing aboriginal title.2 86
Retroactive Extinguishment and Derivative Claims
After Tee-Hit-Ton, a tribe having aboriginal title to land had no
legal claim for damages against the government under the fifth amend-
ment.287 In the 1960's and 1970's, however, tribal attorneys, spurred by
the new generation of public interest attorneys,288 began avoiding the
rule in Tee-Hit-Ton by pressing new claims, none of which involved a
286. United States v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 F. Supp. 1009, 1030-31 (D. Alaska
1977), aff§g, 612 F.2d 1132 (9th Cir. 1980).
287. The government may condemn land by two methods. First, it may act directly by
bringing suit in the federal district court. 28 U.S.C. § 1358 (1976) (original jurisdiction over
all federal proceedings condemning real estate). To do so, the government must act under a
statute granting the particular officer of the government authority to exercise eminent do-
main. See, e.g., 16 U.S.C. §§ 517, 577 (1976) (national forests); id. § 814 (condemnation
power delegated to licensees under the Federal Power Act). See generally 6A NICHOLS,
supra note 124, § 27.1, at 27-4 to 27-5. These statutes provide for just compensation. See,
e.g., 16 U.S.C. § 517a (1976) (national forests); id. § 814 (Federal Power Act) (by implica-
tion). Thus, if the government were to condemn Indian land under one of these statutes, the
tribe would receive just compensation. See, e.g., FPC v. Tuscarora Indian Nation, 362 U.S.
99, 115, 136 (1960) (licensee of FPC could condemn fee simple reservation despite treaty
promise to "forever secure and guaranty" the reservation land). Tee-Hit-Ton should not be
held to affect the right to compensation under such statutes because they represent the con-
gressional directive to pay just compensation as required by Tee-Hit-Ton.
Second, the government may take Indian land without formal condemnation proceed-
ings, although a tribe may have an action for inverse condemnation. 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1346(a)(2) (1976) (district court has concurrent jurisdiction with Court of Claims if
amount does not exceed $10,000); id. § 1491 (Court of Claims jurisdiction). See generally
6A NICHOLS, supra note 124, § 29.1. Tee-Hit-Ton would preclude a tribe holding aboriginal
title from bringing an inverse condemnation action in the Court of Claims.
288. See generally BROKEN TREATIES, supra note 223, at 23-41; Price, Lawyers on the
Reservation: Some Implicationsfor the Legal Profession, 1969 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 161, 190-92,
196-98. Before the 1960's the emphasis in Indian law had been on claims work, because so
many tribes had pre-1946 claims to prosecute. See BROKEN TREATIES, supra note 223, at
207-28. The attorneys were willing to take on protracted litigation on a contingency fee
basis because the financial rewards could be very high in a successful case. Id. at 226. Al-
though the statutory maximum fee for such cases was 10% of any award obtained, 25 U.S.C.
§ 70n (1976), the money judgment could run into the millions of dollars. See notes 233-34
supra. This system worked very well for the pre-1946 claims. But see Price, Lawyers on the
Reservation:~ Some Implications for the Legal Profession, 1969 Aiz. ST. L.J. 161, 187-90,
194. Tribes with no resources were able to hire competent lawyers to prosecute their claims
before the commission. The system did not work as well when the tribe did not have a claim
against the United States cognizable in the Court of Claims. Such would be the case when a
tribe either wished to sue third parties or looked for equitable relief instead of money dam-
ages. See Chambers, Judicial Enforcement of the Federal Trust Responsibility to Indians, 27
STAN. L. REv. 1213, 1235 (1975); Indian Land Claims in Maine and Elsewhere: A Long,
Costly Path, AM. INDIAN J., Dec. 1978, at 45-47. A tribe without resources would find it
very hard to engage counsel when the chance of success seemed slim or when the judgment
would not produce a fee. In addition, attorneys engaged primarily in claims work tended to
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direct claim against the federal government for a fifth amendment tak-
ing of tribal land. Some tribes attempted to sue third parties for tres-
passes on their unextinguished aboriginal land289 while others, barred
from asserting a takings claim, began to use the trust relationship doc-
trine290 as a source of tribal rights against the government. Tradition-
ally, the trust relationship theory had been cited by the courts as a
source of federal power over Indian affairs.29' Tribal attorneys, argu-
ing that the theory also imposed fiduciary obligations on the govern-
ment, began asserting the doctrine as a means of requiring the federal
government to be accountable to its tribal beneficiaries. 292 In land
cases, for example, those espousing the trust theory conceded that the
government could extinguish Indian title with no duty to pay compen-
sation, but argued that Congress must act in the tribe's best interest.293
At the same time the trust relationship theory was developing as a
source of tribal rights, tribal attorneys in the East also began to rely on
accept the Tee-Hit-Ton rule as precluding any kind of claims based on aboriginal title in any
forum.
Public interest attorneys, however, were willing to represent Indian claims without the
incentive of large fees and in areas other than claims against the United States government
for money damages. See text accompanying note 201 supra. Despite Tee-Hit-Ton, they
began to develop new theories to protect Indian land from arbitrary action by the govern-
ment. See, e.g., Chambers, supra, at 1218-19 & n.34, 1235-38 (trust relationship protects
Indian land); Price, Lawyers on the Reservation.: Some Implicationsfor the Legal Profession,
1969 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 161, 187-88 & n.48 (new theories necessary because of plenary power).
289. See, e.g., United States v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 543 F.2d 676 (9th Cir. 1976);
United States v. Atlantic Richfield, Co., 435 F. Supp. 1009 (D. Alaska 1977).
290. See cases cited note 296 infra.
291. See, e.g., Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 567 (1903) (treaty abrogation
power); United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 377-78 (1886) (plenary power doctrine)
(upholding constitutionality of the Major Crimes Act); Fort Berthold Reservation v. United
States, 390 F.2d 686, 691-70 (Ct. C1. 1968) (good faith may convert a fifth amendment taking
into an act of guardianship).
292. See, e.g., Joint Tribal Council of Passamaquoddy Tribe v. Morton, 528 F.2d 370
(1st Cir. 1975) (duty to represent Indian tribe in Nonintercourse Act claim); Manchester
Band of Pomo Indians v. United States, 363 F. Supp. 1238 (N.D. Cal. 1973) (duty to invest
tribal trust funds); Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe v. Morton, 354 F. Supp. 252 (D.D.C. 1973)
(duty to preserve water for tribal lake). See generaly Chambers, supra note 288, at 1234-38.
293. See Edwardsen v. Morton, 369 F. Supp. 1358 (D.D.C. 1973) (action against Secre-
tary of State for breach of trust in allowing third party trespasses); Chambers, supra note
288, at 1218-19 & n.34, 1235-38; Memorandum to the Honorable William B. Gunter from
Archibald Cox at 19-20 (April 29, 1977) (regarding the Maine mediation) (on file with The
Hastings Law Journal). Portions of the Memorandum are reprinted in D. GETCHES, D.
ROSENFELT & C. WILKINSON, FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, CASES AND MATERIALS 249 (1979).
But cf United States v. Mitchell, 100 S. Ct. 1349 (1980) (a tribe may not sue the United
States for breach of fiduciary duty to manage timber held in trust by the government absent
an express congressional assumption of liability for failure to fulfill such duties).
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the Nonintercourse Act.294 This statute, originally enacted in 1790, ex-
pressly invalidates all conveyances of Indian land made without federal
consent.295 Basing their claims on the Nonintercourse Act and the trust
theory, tribes initiated suits against third parties in possession of land
acquired in violation of the statute.296
Although these claims against third parties were not cognizable in
the Court of Claims,297 in 1973 the Supreme Court opened the federal
courts to these suits in Oneida Indian Nation v. County of Oneida.298
The Court in Oneida held that the tribe's claim against the county for
the fair rental value of land sold to the state allegedly in violation of the
Nonintercourse Act stated a controversy arising under the laws of the
United States. The complaint, based on the doctrine of discovery, was
found adequately to allege a violation of federal law.2 99 The tribe thus
was able to invoke the jurisdiction of the district court.
Oneida not surprisingly precipitated a host of Nonintercourse Act
suits in federal courts. Tribes filed suits seeking invalidation of convey-
ances based on void purchases by the states,30" fair rental value for use
294. See, e.g., Joint Tribal Council of Passamaquoddy Tribe v. Morton, 528 F.2d 370,
375-76 (Ist Cir. 1975).
295. 25 U.S.C. § 177 (1976). "No purchase, grant, lease, or other conveyance of lands,
or of any title or claim thereto, from any Indian nation or tribe of Indians, shall be of any
validity in law or equity, unless the same be made by treaty or convention entered into
pursuant to the Constitution." Id.
296. See, e.g., Oneida Indian Nation v. County of Oneida, 414 U.S. 661 (1974); Schagh-
ticoke Tribe of Indians v. Kent School Corp., 423 F. Supp. 780 (D. Conn. 1976). Tribes also
brought suit to require the federal government, as trustee, to represent them in their aborigi-
nal land claims against third parties. See, e.g., Joint Tribal Council of Passamaquoddy
Tribe v. Morton, 538 F.2d 370 (1st Cir. 1975); Edwardsen v. Morton, 369 F. Supp. 1358
(D.D.C. 1973). See generally Clinton & Hotopp, Judicial Enforcement of the Federal Re-
straints on Alienation of Indian Land: The Origins ofthe Eastern Land Claims, 31 M.L. REv.
17 (1979); O'Toole & Tureen, State Power and the Passamaquoddy Tribe: "4 Gross National
Hypocrisy?", 23 M.L. REv. 1 (1971); Paterson & Roseman, A Reexamination of Passama-
quoddy v. Morton, 31 M.L. REv. 115 (1979); Comment, Resolution of Eastern Indian Land
Claims: A Proposal/or Negotiated Settlements, 27 AM. U.L. REv. 695 (1978).
297. While the claims may have been brought in state courts, they often proved to be
inhospitable forums. See, e.g., St. Regis Tribe of Mohawk Indians v. State of New York, 5
N.Y.2d 24, 152 N.E.2d 411, 177 N.Y.S.2d 289 (1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 910 (1959)
(Nonintercourse Act not applicable to State of New York); c. McClanahan v. Arizona State
Tax Comm'n, 14 Ariz. App. 452, 606, 484 P.2d 221 (1971), rev'd, 411 U.S. 164 (1973) (state
may not tax income of Indian earned on the reservation).
298. 414 U.S. 661 (1974).
299. Id. at 666. In addition to opening the federal courts to Nonintercourse Act cases,
Oneida may have signaled a willingness on the part of the present Court to reconsider Tee-
Hit-Ton. See notes 355-59 & accompanying text infra.
300. Mashpee Tribe v. New Seabury Corp., 592 F.2d 575 (1st Cir. 1979) (action for
possession unsuccessful because unable to prove status as a tribe); Schaghticoke Tribe v.
Kent School Corp., 423 F. Supp. 780 (D. Conn. 1976) (action for possession); Narragansett
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of the land,30' or for damages for trespass based on interference with
the tribe's possessory rights.302 Suits for ejectment and damages also
were filed by the federal government as guardian of several tribes.30 3
Although trial proceedings have begun in only one case, 304 there
are indications that many of these claims are likely to be successful. 305
Furthermore, because law suits cloud title to millions of acres of land
in at least eight states, the federal and state governments are under ex-
Tribe v. Southern R.I. Land Dev. Co., 418 F. Supp. 798 (D.R.I. 1976) (action for posses-
sion).
301. See, e.g., Oneida Indian Nation v. County of Oneida, 434 F. Supp. 527 (N.D.N.Y.
1977).
302. Miccosukee Tribe v. State of Florida, No. 79-253-Civ. JAG (S.D. Fl., filed Jan. 17,
1979).
303. The United States filed protective claims on behalf of both the Passamaquoddy and
Penobscot tribes in Maine in February of 1977. Joint Tribal Council of Passamaquoddy
Tribe v. Morton, 528 F.2d 370, 373 (1st Cir. 1975). These suits have been stayed pending
settlement negotiations. See Vollmann, A Survey of Eastern Indian Land Claims: 1970-
1979, 31 M.L. REV. 5, 10 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Vollmann]. In addition, Congress
extended the statute of limitations until April 1, 1980, to prevent the possibly needless ex-
pense to the government of filing hundreds of protective actions. 28 U.S.C. § 2415(b) (Supp.
11 1978). The Interior Department meanwhile has attempted to bring about settlements of
the claims. See Vollmann, supra, at 12-14.
304. See Oneida Indian Nation v. County of Oneida, 434 F. Supp. 527 (N.D.N.Y. 1977).
The Interior Department has been involved in eight eastern land claim suits, including the
claims of the Penobscots and Passamaquoddies in Maine; the Oneidas, Cayugas, and St.
Regis Mohawk tribes in New York; the Catawbas in South Carolina; the Chitimacha tribe in
Louisiana; and the Narragansetts of Rhode Island. See Vollmann, supra note 303, at 11-14.
305. The courts in the First Circuit have adopted a four step test to establish a
Nonintercourse Act claim. See Mashpee Tribe v. New Seabury Corp., 427 F. Supp. 899 (D.
Mass. 1977). First, the plaintiff must show that the claimant tribe is a tribe within the mean-
ing of the Nonintercourse Act as defined by Montoya v. United States, 180 U.S. 261, 266
(1901). Second, the tribe must show that its tribal land was covered by the Act. Third, the
tribe must prove the United States has never approved the alienation of the land. Fourth,
the tribe must show that the trust relationship between the federal government and the tribe
has never been terminated. If the plaintiffs are successful in establishing these elements, the
defendants may raise no state law defenses, such as laches, adverse possession, or bona fide
purchaser for value. Oneida Indian Nation v. County of Oneida, 434 F. Supp. 527, 542
(N.D.N.Y. 1977). This is true even in cases brought by the tribe itself, for "[it would be
anomalous to permit the government, as trustee for the Indians, to achieve a result more
beneficial to the Indians than the Indians could, suing on their own behalf." Id. at 543.
Consequently, once the tribe proves each of the four elements constituting its claim, it has
won its case. See Oneida Indian Nation v. County of Oneida, 434 F. Supp. 527, 537-38
(N.D.N.Y. 1977); Mashpee Tribe v. New Seabury Corp., 427 F. Supp. 899, 902 (D. Mass.
1977), aft'd, 592 F.2d 575 (1st Cir. 1979); Narragansett Tribe v. Southern R. I. Dev. Corp.,
418 F. Supp. 798 (1976); Joint Tribal Council of Passamaquoddy Tribe v. Morton, 388 F.
Supp. 649, 656-57, ari'd, 528 F.2d 370 (1st Cir. 1975). In cases in which the tribe itself has
sued, the fourth element--continuing existence of a trust relationship-need not be shown.
See, e.g., Oneida Indian Nation v. County of Oneida, 434 F. Supp. 527, 543 (1977). Accord,
Schaghticoke Tribe v. Kent School Corp., 423 F. Supp. 780 (D. Conn. 1976); Narragansett
Tribe v. Southern R.I. Dev. Corp., 418 F. Supp. 798 (D.R.I. 1976).
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treme pressure to propose settlement agreements. 30 6 In 1977, President
Carter apppointed former Georgia Supreme Court Justice William B.
Gunter to mediate the largest of the claims, that of the Penobscots and
Passamaquoddies to over 12 million acres in Maine. Although no final
settlement has been reached in that case, the State of Maine and the
tribes recently reached a tentative agreement which would give
$81,500,000.307 In addition, the Narragansett and Cayuga tribes have
almost finalized settlements of their claims.30 8 An Interior Department
attorney familiar with the negotiations recently expressed confidence
that all the claims will be settled amicably in the near future.30 9
A recent case, however, indicates that the newly asserted deriva-
tive claims are not immune from the influence of Tee-Hilt-Ton. In
United States v. Atlantic Richfield Co.310 (ARCO), a federal district
court construed Tee-Hit-Ton to authorize not only congressional extin-
guishment of tribal derivative claims based on presently held aborigi-
nal title, but also congressional extinguishment of previously accrued
derivative claims.311 ARCO thus interpreted Tee-Hit-Ton as recogniz-
ing Congress's authority to extinguish retroactively rights based on ab-
original title.
The following section analyzes two cases arising from Alaska na-
tives' claims for trespass violations. Both cases address the authority of
Congress to extinguish tribal derivative claims, with particular empha-
sis on the ARCO decision. This analysis is followed by an examination
of the validity and propriety of congressional authority to extinguish
retroactively either aboriginal title or rights based on aboriginal title.
Edwardsen and ARCO-Two Views of Congressional Power to Extinguish
An understanding of the Alaskan trespass claims requires famili-
arity with both the land selection provision of the Alaska Statehood
Act312 and the extinguishment provision of the Alaska Native Claims
Settlement Act.3 13 When Alaska was admitted into the Union in 1959,
306. See VoIlmann, supra note 303, at 12-16.
307. Washington Post, April 4, 1980, at A5. The agreement will not become final until
Congress agrees to assume the entire financial burden and enacts the settlement into law.
Because of the current state of the economy, Maine's attorney general predicted "a very
tough battle." Id. at A7.
308. See Vollmann, supra note 303, at 13 & n.41.1 (Cayuga), 13-14 & nn.43, 43.1 (Nar-
rangansett).
309. Id. at 16.
310. 435 F. Supp. 1009 (D. Alaska 1977), at'd, 612 F.2d 1132 (9th Cir. 1980).
311. Id. at 1029-30.
312. Alaska Statehood Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-508, 72 Stat. 339.
313. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1624 (1976 & Supp. 11 1978).
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the Statehood Act permitted the state to choose approximately
100,000,000 acres of "vacant, unappropriated, and unreserved" public
land.314 The statutory scheme required the Secretary of the Interior to
approve all such land selections. Once the Secretary had tentatively
approved the selections, however, the state could lease or sell the land
conditioned upon his final approval.315 During the selection period,
Alaska natives claimed unextinguished aboriginal title to most of
Alaska's 272,000,000 acres. In 1966, Secretary Udall responded by im-
posing a freeze on further tentative approvals until the extent of the
claims could be ascertained. Tentative approvals already had been is-
sued, however, for state selections in the Arctic Slope, where Prudhoe
Bay was located. When oil deposits were discovered in Prudhoe Bay,
the state immediately leased the area to oil companies for more than
$900,000,000. 3 16 Although previously approved land was lost by the
lease, the land freeze did preserve the unselected native land and, more
importantly, spurred Congress to resolve the claims.317
Because Tee-Hit-Ton allowed Congress to extinguish the native's
aboriginal title without compensation, native groups lobbied Congress
to fulfill a moral obligation to recompense them. Congress responded
in 1971 by enacting the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act. 318 The
Settlement Act extinguished all aboriginal title to Alaska land, while
creating a compensation scheme giving the natives over $950,000,000.
Furthermore, the Settlement Act gave the natives the right to select
38,000,000 acres of formerly aboriginal land to be patented in fee to
native corporations set up under the statute.31 9
Section 1603 of the Settlement Act 320 purported to extinguish all
314. Alaska Statehood Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-508, § 6(a)-(b), 72 Stat. 339.
315. Id. § 6(g), 72 Stat. at 340-41.
316. See Edwardsen v. Morton, 369 F. Supp. 1359, 1364 (D.D.C. 1973).
317. Id. at 1364-65.
318. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1624 (1976 & Supp. II 1978). See generaly Price, A Moment in
History The Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act, 8 U.C.L.A.-ALASKA L. REV. 89 (1979).
319. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1605, 1611 (1976 & Supp. I 1978).
320. "(a) All prior conveyances of public land and water areas in Alaska, or any inter-
est therein, pursuant to Federal law, and all tentative approvals pursuant to section 6(g) of
the Alaska Statehood Act, shall be regarded as an extinguishment of the aboriginal title
thereto, if any.
"(b) All aboriginal titles, if any, and claims of aboriginal title in Alaska based on use
and occupancy, including submerged land underneath all water areas, both inland and off-
shore, and including any aboriginal hunting or fishing rights that may exist, are hereby
extinguished.
"(c) All claims against the United States, the State, and all other persons that are
based on claims of aboriginal right, title, use, or occupancy of land or water areas in Alaska,
or that are based on any statute or treaty of the United States relating to Native use and
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claims to aboriginal land and all claims against anyone based on ab-
original title. Rather than extinguishing claims to aboriginal lands as
of the date of the Settlement Act, however, the statute explicitly ratified
all prior conveyances and tentative approvals of aboriginal lands made
by the Secretary of the Interior pursuant to the Statehood Act. Hence,
the Settlement Act retroactively extinguished aboriginal title. With re-
spect to retroactive extinguishment of claims based on that aboriginal
title, the statute was unclear, stating only that the claims "are hereby
extinguished." 321
Edwardsen v. Morton
The first of the Alaska trespass suits, Edwardsen v. Morton,322 was
brought by Arctic Slope natives. The crux of the complaint was that
the natives' oil-rich land in the Arctic Slope had never passed rightfully
to the State of Alaska when the state chose their land during the selec-
tion period. They argued first that the Settlement Act authorized the
Secretary of the Interior to approve selections only of "vacant, unap-
propriated, and unreserved [land]," not aboriginal land.323 The natives
alleged that because the Secretary of the Interior acted in excess of his
authority, the tentative approvals granting the natives' aboriginal land
were void. Second, the natives argued that the activities of oil and con-
struction companies in prospecting for and exploiting oil deposits, be-
ing unauthorized, were trespasses. Because the federal government had
been responsible for these illegal entrances by wrongfully issuing tenta-
tive approvals to land selections made in the native-claimed area, the
natives argued that the federal government had breached its fiduciary
duty to protect their interests. 324 Among the damages claimed for this
breach of duty was compensation" 'for all monies received by the State
of Alaska and other third persons'" resulting from the allegedly im-
proper approvals of state selections.325 The defendant moved for sum-
mary judgment, arguing that section 1603 of the Settlement Act had
extinguished all the claims.326
occupancy, or that are based on the laws of any other nation, including any such claims that
are pending before any Federal or state court or the Indian Claims Commission, are hereby
extinguished." Id. § 1603.
321. Id.
322. 369 F. Supp. 1359 (D.D.C. 1973).
323. Id. at 1366-67.
324. Id. at 1367.
325. Id. at 1368.
326. Id.
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The court in Edwardsen distinguished between those claims di-
rectly challenging title to land327 and those derivative claims based on
aboriginal ownership.328 In addressing the native's claims directly
challenging the extinguishment of aboriginal title, the court first noted
that the Secretary of the Interior had acted in excess of his authority in
granting the tentative approvals. Despite this lack of authority, how-
ever, the court held that Congress could validate the grants by retroac-
tively authorizing the actions of its agents made outside the scope of
their authority.32 9 Accordingly, the court reasoned that the Settlement
Act had extinguished all claims directly challenging the extinguishment
of aboriginal title. Summary judgment was therefore granted for the
defendant on all the claims that would have resulted in the cancellation
of any leases or conveyances made under the Settlement Act.330
The court refused to grant summary judgment for the defendant
on the plaintiffs derivative breach of fiduciary duty claims: reasoning
that despite language in section 1603(c) extinguishing claims based on
aboriginal title,33' the plaintiffs had legitimate claims for trespass
against the construction and oil companies for interfering with their
possessory rights to the land.332 In addition, if the plaintiffs could
prove that the physical intrusions on their land were caused by the de-
fendant's actions in approving the leases, then the defendant had
breached its fiduciary duty to the plaintiffs to protect their land against
these intrusions.333 The claims, accruing before the date of the Settle-
ment Act, were therefore found to be "vested property rights protected
by the fifth amendment. ' 334 The court's construction of section 1603(c)
327. Id. at 1377.
328. Id. at 1378-79.
329. Id. at 1377.
330. Id. at 1378.
331. See note 320 supra.
332. The court noted that trespass actions protect those in possession of the land. In
addition, the defendants could not escape liability by asserting that they mistakenly believed
they were entitled to enter, or by asserting that they had permission to enter. 369 F. Supp. at
1371 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 164 (1965)). See also W. PROSSER, THE
LAW OF TORTS § 13, at 68-69 (4th ed. 1971).
333. Edwardsen v. Morton, 369 F. Supp. 1359, 1378-79 (D.D.C. 1973).
334. Id. at 1379 (citing Coombes v. Getz, 285 U.S. 434, 448 (1932); Ettor v. City of
Tacoma, 228 U.S. 148 (1913)). Although the opinion did not state what clause of the fifth
amendment would be violated, the court cited cases relying on the due process clause. Thus,
it appears that had the court faced an explicit provision extinguishing accrued claims based
on aboriginal title, it might have struck down the provision because it violated a substantive
guarantee of the due process clause, rather than the taking clause. This argument recently
has been raised in the settlement negotiations in the Maine case. See note 307 & accompa-
nying text supra.
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thus avoided the constitutional difficulties attendant to a broader inter-
pretation.335
United States v. Atlantic Richfield Co.
As part of a settlement agreement between the parties in Edward-
sen, the federal government brought suit in federal court against the
State of Alaska and 140 corporate defendants for pre-Settlement Act
trespasses on the Arctic Slope. Contrary to the approach taken in Ed-
wardsen, however, the trial court in United States v. Atlantic Richfield
Co.336 (ARCO) held that section 1603(c) did extinguish all derivative
tort claims, including those occurring before the Settlement Act.337 The
court first held that section 1603(a), by extinguishing aboriginal title as
of the date of the pre-Settlement Act approvals, also extinguished any
trespass claims based on the entries "authorized" by the invalid tenta-
tive approvals.338 The natives also had asserted trespass claims against
the defendants for entries on the North Slope that had not been author-
ized by a pre-Settlement Act approval and, therefore, were not covered
by section 1603(a). Nevertheless, the court held these trespasses also to
have been extinguished by section 1603(C). 339 In further contrast to Ed-
wardsen, the court ruled that this extinguishment did not violate the
fifth amendment because "trespass claims based on unrecognized ab-
original title are not protected property interests and, therefore, the Set-
tlement Act's extinguishment of Native trespass claims against third
parties presents no constitutional problem. ' 340 Relying on Tee-Hit-
Ton, which held that the federal government can extinguish aboriginal
title without compensation, the court reasoned:
It follows that a claim of a past interference with aboriginal use and
occupancy is not a property interest and therefore such claim may
also be terminated by Congress at will without compensation. Since
the underlying interest ... is not constitutionally protected, trespass
or other claims of interference with the underlying interest likewise
fall outside of constitutional protection.34'
The court noted that its holding did not preclude Indians having ab-
original title from being able to invoke the judicial aid to prevent inter-
ference with their possessory rights; rather, the extent to which the
courts would protect aboriginal title against third party intrusion was a
335. 369 F. Supp. at 1379.
336. 435 F. Supp. 1009 (D. Alaska 1977), a'd, 612 F.2d 1132 (9th Cir. 1980).
337. Id. at 1025-29.
338. Id. at 1025.
339. Id. at 1025-26.
340. Id. at 1029-30.
341. Id. at 1030.
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question to be decided in a proper case.342 The federal government
and the Inupiat Community, intervenors in the district court, appealed
this decision to the Ninth Circuit, which only recently affirmed the
lower court's holding that the Native Claims Settlement Act had extin-
guished retroactively all the native trespass claimS. 343 The court of ap-
peal refused to reach the constitutional issue, however, because it was
not properly before the court in a trespass claim against private par-
ties.344
The constitutional issue will eventually have to be decided, be-
cause the Inupiat Community, intervenors in the ARCO case, are cur-
rently litigating a fifth amendment taking action in the court of
claims.345 In resolving that question, the court of claims will surely pay
close attention to the reasoning in the district court opinions of both
ARCO and Edwardsen.
Analysis
The district court opinions in ARCO and Edwardsen represent two
competing views as to the scope of the Tee-Hit-Ton decision. The court
in Edwardsen read Tee-Hit-Ton as not permitting Congress to destroy
accrued causes of action for breach of fiduciary duty to protect aborigi-
nal land. The lower court in ARCO, however, interpreted Tee-Hit-Ton
more broadly, holding no claim based on or related to aboriginal title is
a property right.
The degree to which the district court in ARCO was willing to
extend the rule of Tee-Hit-Ton is surprising. Justice Reed, author of
Tee-Hit-Ton, recognized the proper limits of Tee-Hit-Ton when he
stated that aboriginal title is "not a property right but . . . a right of
occupancy which the sovereign grants and protects against intrusion by
third parties." 346 Although the district court in ARCO conceded that
for some third party intrusions the government may provide a remedy
"to effectuate the United States' policy of protecting Indian occupancy
against third party intrusion, ' 347 it concluded that no such provision
342. Id. at 1030-31.
343. 612 F.2d at 1134.
344. See id. at 1139. The district courts in ARCO and Edwardsen had reached the con-
stitutional issue by applying the rule that statutes should be construed to avoid constitutional
questions. Compare Edwardsen v. Morton, 69 F. Supp. 1359, 1379 (D.D.C. 1973), with
United States v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 F. Supp. 1009, 1029 (D. Alas. 1977).
345. Inupiat Community v. United States, No. 77-596 (Ct. Cl., filed Dec. 16, 1977).
346. 348 U.S. at 279.
347. 435 F. Supp. at 1030.
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existed in that case.348 Moreover, the likelihood of relief in any case
following the rationale of the district court in ARCO is slim, as evi-
denced by the court's observation that no decision had ever squarely
held that aboriginal title, in and of itself, gave the Indian owner any
kind of property right, including a right sufficient to sue for trespass. 349
Thus, from the narrow holding in Tee-Hit-Ton that aboriginal title is
not a property right protected against seizure by the sovereign, the dis-
trict court in ARCO concluded that aboriginal title is not a property
right for any reason.350 Because the core of a property right is the right
to exclude,351 if the aboriginal owner cannot keep others off his land, he
has no property at all; any rights of the aboriginal owner to use the
land would be meaningless.
The interpretation of Tee-Hit-Ton by the district court in ARCO
may have as strong a potential effect on derivative claims as Tee-Hit-
Ton had on direct claims. Under this reasoning, even a tribe holding
extinguished aboriginal title to land may be deemed not to have a suffi-
cient property right to enforce claims for third party intrusions. Hence,
tribes occupying executive order reservations or other land reserved by
treaties that did not recognize title in the Tee-Hit-Ton sense would have
no power to exclude trespassers or to enforce the federal government's
fiduciary duty to protect Indian occupancy. By undermining the deriv-
ative claims and authorizing activity in violation of the tribe's right to
exclude third parties, the rationale of the lower court in ARCO poten-
tially jeopardizes the minimal protection aboriginal title has tradition-
ally received.
Retroactive Extinguishment Remaining Questions
Those supporting congressional authority to extinguish tribal
rights retroactively can be expected to rely heavily on the approach
taken by the lower court in ARCO. For example, in recent eastern
tribal land claims litigation, the American Land Title Association
348. Id. at 1030-31.
349. Id. at 1029-30. The court distinguished two cases in which tribes successfully as-
serted trespass claims as involving "more than mere unrecognized aboriginal title" because
the tribes in those cases had occupancy rights "recognized in an Executive Order Reserva-
tion." Id. at 1030 n.66. Executive orders, however, do not create recognized title. See text
accompanying notes 236-50 supra. Both cases also permitted recovery for trespass to purely
aboriginal land before the executive order reservations were created. See United States ex
rel. Hualpai Indians v. Sante Fe Pac. R.R., 314 U.S. 339 (1941) (discussed in text accompa-
nying notes 186-89 supra); United States v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 543 F.2d 676 (9th
Cir. 1976).
350. 435 F. Supp. at 1030-31.
351. See 2 NICHOLS, supra note 124, § 5.1(1), at 5-8 (quoting Jeremy Bentham).
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(ALTA) urged that Congress rely on its "plenary and absolute power"
to settle the claims unilaterally. 352 In so urging, ALTA submitted to
Congress proposed legislation, entitled "Model Statutory Language to
Clear Title of Indian Claims," expressly providing for the retroactive
extinguishment of derivative claims as of the date of the purportedly
invalid transfer. 353
This proposed legislation has more than speculative value. The
congressional ratification of the Narragansett settlement contains an
extinguishment provision tracking ALTA's model language almost ver-
batim. 354 Although that settlement was voluntary and thus raises no
constitutional questions, 35 5 adoption by Congress of ALTA's model
language indicates that the committee members have read the lobbying
brief carefully.
Because of the possible adverse consequences resulting from retro-
active extinguishment of aboriginal rights, it is important to examine
the legal foundation supporting such extinguishment. The analyses
employed by the district courts in ARCO and Edwardsen have not been
helpful in this regard, because they focused too narrowly on Indian law
and not sufficiently on constitutional law.
The district court opinions in both ARCO and Edwardsen reveal
the respective courts' failure to consider adequately the issue of retroac-
tive extinguishment. In Edwardsen, Judge Gasch relied on the imper-
missibility of abrogating "vested property rights" in refusing to give the
statute retroactive effect. 356 Although earlier decisions also have used
the term "vested property rights,"357 the expression has yet to acquire a
precise meaning. More significantly, reliance on the "vested property
rights" theory results in circular reasoning; the courts determine that a
352. American Land Title Association, Indian Land Claims Under the Nonintercourse
Act: The Constitutional Basis and Need for a Legislative Solution 43 (1978) [hereinafter
cited as ALTA Lobbying Brief].
353. Id. app., at 1-2.
354. Compare Rhode Island Indian Claims Settlement Act, §§ 6, 13, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1705,
1712 (Supp. 11 1978), with ALTA Lobbying Brief, supra note 352, app. §§ (a)-(c), at 1-2.
355. Forbearing suit on even an invalid claim can be sufficient consideration for a con-
tract. See, e.g., Fiege v. Boehm, 210 Md. 352, 360, 123 A.2d 316, 321 (1956); A. CORBIN,
CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 140, at 202-04 (one vol. ed. 1952); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS § 76B (1973). As a matter of constitutional law, the settlement also would be
held to be a knowing, voluntary waiver of any constitutional right in the property rights
represented by aboriginal title and the accrued causes of action based upon such property
rights. Cf. D.H. Overmyer Co. v. Frick Co., 405 U.S. 174, 185 (1972) (waiver of due process
rights to a civil proceeding must be knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently given).
356. 369 F. Supp. at 1379.
357. See, e.g., Ettor v. City of Tacoma, 228 U.S. 148, 155-58 (1913); Addison v. Huron
Stevedoring Corp., 204 F.2d 88, 102 (2d Cir. 1953) (Frank, J., dissenting).
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retroactive statute is improper and then state this conclusion by finding
the preenactment legal relationships as being based on a vested right,
without explaining the phrase. For this reason, the vested rights analy-
sis has been the subject of much criticism.3 58 On the other hand, the
district court in ARCO failed even to address the constitutional legiti-
macy of congressional authority to extinguish rights retroactively. In-
stead, the court relied on Tee-Hit-Ton as establishing that virtually all
governmental action abrogating rights connected with aboriginal land
is constitutional, 359 despite the fact that Tee-Hit-Ton did not involve
retroactive legislation.
An analysis of the few sources considering retroactivity as it affects
congressional power to extinguish the eastern land claims reveals simi-
lar doctrinal confusion.3 60 For example, ALTA's lobbying brief, while
devoting considerable discussion to retroactivity from a fifth amend-
ment taking clause perspective,36' fails to consider the general constitu-
tional problems of retroactivity; rather, the brief concentrates on case
law peculiar to Indian affairs.362 Moreover, the decisions relied upon
by ALTA did not consider the legitimacy of retroactive legislation, but
rather the propriety of a congressional action "relating" back to a date
for the specific purpose of determining the amount of damages recover-
able by a tribe.363 Each of these opinions relied on the theory of ratifi-
cation, whereby the government is deemed to have ratified the
wrongful action of a third party.364
358. See, e.g., Greenblatt, Judicial Limitations on Retroactive Civil Legislation, 51 Nw.
U.L. REv. 540, 561-62 (1956) [hereinafter cited as Greenblatt]; Hochman, The Supreme
Court and the Constitutionality of Retroactive Legislation, 73 HARV. L. REV. 692, 696 (1960)
[hereinafter cited as Hochman]; Slawson, Constitutional and Legislative Considerations in
Retroactive Lawmaking, 48 CALIF. L. REv. 216, 220 (1960) [hereinafter cited as Slawson];
Smith, Retroactive Laws and Vested Rights, 5 TEX. L. REV. 231, 246-47 (1927).
359. 435 F. Supp. at 1030.
360. For example, the House Committee Report on the proposed Rhode Island Indian
Claim Settlement Act alluded vaguely to "potentially troublesome legal issues" raised by the
involuntary retroactive provisions of the bill. H.R. REP. No. 1454, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 9,
reprintedin [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1948, 1953.
361. ALTA Lobbying Brief, supra note 352, at 62-73.
362. Id.
363. See Shoshone Tribe v. United States, 299 U.S. 476 (1937); United States v. North-
ern Paiute Nation, 490 F.2d 954 (Ct. Cl. 1974).
364. For an example of this use of ratification in a successful fifth amendment taking
claim, and the only Supreme Court ratification case, see Shoshone Tribe v. United States,
299 U.S. 476 (1937), discussed in text accompanying notes 168-71 supra. In 1878, the Army
escorted a band of homeless Arapahoes to the Shoshone reservation. The Shoshones al-
lowed the Arapahoes to stay temporarily at the urging of the Indian agent attached to the
Shoshone reservation. Within one month the entire Arapahoe tribe arrived and settled. The
Shoshones protested unsuccessfully. Finally, in 1891, the Commissioner of Indian Affairs,
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The ratification doctrine has been employed in contexts other than
Indian law, usually to uphold "curative legislation," so-called because
it is designed to cure unanticipated defects in the interpretation or ad-
ministration of an earlier law.365 The ratification analysis, however,
has been criticized as a false analogy to agency law, 366 and for confus-
ing rather than resolving the due process questions raised by retroactive
legislation.367 Concededly, the due process objections to the applica-
tion of the ratification theory raised in the cases cited by ALTA are
minimal because the ratification generally resulted in federal govern-
ment liability.368 Application of the ratification theory to cases involv-
ing retroactive extinguishment of aboriginal title to foreclose tribal
who had ignored the Shoshone's protests for thirteen years, issued a formal opinion that the
Arapahoes had an equal right to the land on the reservation. 299 U.S. at 488-89. The Court
of Claims held that the forced settling of the Arapahoes on Shoshone land was a taking of
an undivided one-half interest of the land. Id. at 485, 492. The only question presented to
the Supreme Court was the measure of damages, which in turn raised the issue of when the
taking had occurred. The Supreme Court held that the land was to be valued as of March,
1878, the date of the original entry on the land, and not thirteen years later when the Com-
missioner issued his formal opinion. Noting that the Commissioner did not have the author-
ity to exercise the government's power of eminent domain, the Court stated that the opinion
letter merely capped thirteen years of the Commissioner's efforts to cause the very event he
then officially acknowledged. Id. at 494. Accordingly, the Court opted for the date of the
original trespass. Although neither the Army, the Indian agent, nor the Arapahoes them-
selves had the power to exercise eminent domain, thereby making the original settlement a
trespass, the Court commented that "however tortious in its origin, it has been permanent in
fact . . . . [Tihe Government of the United States through the action and inaction of its
executive and legislative departments for half a century of time, has ratified the wrong,
adopting the defacto appropriation by relation as of the date of its beginning." Id. at 495.
Cf. United States v. Northern Paiute Nation, 490 F.2d 954 (Ct. Cl. 1974) (ratification of
tortious entries in the Comstock by miners extinguishing trespass claims and creating a stat-
utory claim for taking of aboriginal title valued as of the time of the original trespasses).
365. Compare United States v. Heinszen & Co., 206 U.S. 370 (1907) (statutory confirma-
tion of preenactment collection of duties by Philippine government upheld because the stat-
ute cured the earlier failure to delegate power), with Forbes Pioneer Boat Lines v. Board of
Comm'rs., 258 U.S. 338 (1922) (statutory confirmation of preenactment collection of taxes
violated due process because no colorable argument for authority could have been made
when the taxes were collected). Professor Slawson has distinguished the latter case as one
influenced by a judicial desire not to encourage official irresponsibility. Slawson, supra note
358, at 239.
366. See, e.g., Slawson, supra note 358, at 240.
367. See, e.g., id.; Greenblatt, supra note 358, at 561-62. Cf. Hochman, supra note 358,
at 704 (confining ratification to fact patterns fitting the agency concept).
368. The analogy to agency law is still inappropriate, however. The ratification doctrine
was developed primarily "to cure minor defects in an agent's authority, minimizing techni-
cal defenses and preventing unnecessary law suits." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY
§ 82, Comment d (1957). Ratification properly should be used to create liabilities for the
principal, not to minimize or destroy them. See, e.g., W. SEAVEY, THE LAW OF AGENCY
§ 35, at 63 (1964); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 90, Comment a (1957). Neverthe-
[Vol. 31
ABORIGINAL TITLE
recovery absolutely, 369 however, expands the theory beyond its in-
tended scope and furthers confusion regarding the legitimacy of retro-
active extinguishment of aboriginal rights. 370
The shortcomings of both the ratification and vested rights theo-
ries are strong reasons for discarding them in determining the legiti-
macy of retroactive extinguishment of aboriginal rights.
Whether phrased as present extinguishment coupled with valida-
tion of past unlawful transfers37' or as retroactive extinguishment of
less, the Court in Shoshone related back the taking to the original tort, resulting in govern-
mental nonliability.
One case cited by ALTA relied on ratification to permit the state and federal govern-
ment to escape liability. Seneca Nation v. United States, 173 Ct. Cl. 912 (1965). See ALTA
Lobbying Brief, supra note 352, at 47-48. The Court of Claims in Seneca held that a 1927
statute referring to Seneca land condemned by the State of New York to build a dam in 1858
implicitly ratified the condemnation, which otherwise would have been void as a violation of
the Nonintercourse Act. 173 Ct. Cl. at 913. Having concluded that there was no
Nonintercourse Act claim because of the ratification, the court held that the Senecas could
not recover against the United States for breach of the government's duty to prevent the
state from acquiring this land. Id. at 916. The court incorrectly interpreted the ambiguous
legislation as retroactive. See Greenblatt, supra note 358, at 551-53. The result might none-
theless have been the same had the court engaged in a careful due process analysis. First,
the amount of land was small, only 50 acres. Second, the state condemned the land to build
a dam and canal system, traditionally regarded as a legitimate objective serving the interests
of the public, both Indians and non-Indians. Third, the tribe apparently did not protest
until the suit was filed with the Indian Claims Commission, sometime after 1946. Finally,
the state had paid fair market value for the acquired land, a point the tribe conceded in its
suit against the federal government. 173 Ct. Cl. at 914-16.
369. ALTA argued that Congress may ratify by legislation all past illegal transfers of
aboriginal title lands, whether consensual or not, and thereby extinguish aboriginal title
"without giving rise to any valid claims that such legislation constitutes a taking of property
compensable under the Fifth Amendment." ALTA Lobbying Brief, supra note 352, at 42.
370. The tribes' attorneys have not been immune from the confusion surrounding the
constitutional underpinnings of retroactive legislation. In a memorandum to Judge Gunter
concerning the Maine settlement negotiations, attorneys for the tribe addressed the constitu-
tional issues merely by asserting that trespass claims are protected by the fifth amendment
taking clause. Memorandum to the Honorable William B. Gunter from Archibald Cox, at
26-27 (April 29, 1977) (on file with The Hastings Law Journal).
In addition, the tribes argued that the eastern treaties could not be ratified retroactively
because agency law does not permit ratification of an unconstitutional act or an act taken by
someone standing in no agency relationship to the government. 1d. at 26. If ratification is
seen as an agency concept, the tribal attorneys are correct as a matter of agency law. See,
e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 85 (1957) (essential element of ratification is
that agent purported to act on behalf of a principal or intended to so act). See also id. § 88,
Comment a (ratification not effective if the third party has attempted to withdraw from the
transaction, because the third party is treated as an offeror, who can revoke his offer prior to
affirmance by the principal). The eastern tribes might therefore argue that they revoked
their offers by filing lawsuits and that ratification thus is no longer possible.
371. See H.R. REP. No. 1453, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 9, reprInted i [19781 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 1948, 1953.
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claims directly or derivatively based on aboriginal title as of the date of
the invalid transfer,372 legislation giving "preenactment conduct a dif-
ferent legal effect from that which it would have had without the pas-
sage of the statute" 373 is retroactive legislation. Although legislation
affecting preenactment rights occasionally has been analyzed under
other constitutional provisions,374 most commentators consider the due
process clause to be the provision safeguarding against retroactive leg-
islation. 375 Indeed, the only Supreme Court decision invalidating legis-
lation affecting accrued causes of action in tort relied on the due
process clause.376
Outside the context of Indian law, a due process analysis of retro-
active legislation requires balancing the competing interests of private
parties and the public. To be sustained, the legislation must appear
reasonable. 377 Professor Hochman has suggested three factors that
courts should consider when determining the constitutionality of retro-
active legislation: "the nature and strength of the public interest served
by the statute, the extent to which the statute modifies or abrogates the
assorted preenactment right, and the nature of the right which the stat-
ute alters. '378
The complexity of the factors that must be considered in determin-
ing the legitimacy of congressional authority to extinguish retroactively
372. See Rhode Island Indian Claims Settlement Act, § 6(a)(2)-(3), 25 U.S.C.
§ 1705(a)(2)-(3) (Supp. 11 1978).
373. Hochman, supra note 358, at 692.
374. The Supreme Court decided long ago that the exposifacto prohibition in the Con-
stitution applied only to retroactive criminal legislation. Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 385
(1978) (construing U.S. CoNsT. art. I, §§ 9, cl. 3; 10, cl. 1). The Court then began to apply
the contract clause to retroactive legislation affecting contract rights. See, e.g., Coombes v.
Getz, 285 U.S. 434, 448 (1932); Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 136-48 (1810).
375. See, e.g., Greenblatt, supra note 358, at 543; Hochman, supra note 358, at 694-95;
Slawson, supra note 358, at 221.
376. See Ettor v. City of Tacoma, 228 U.S. 148 (1913). Ellor involved the repeal of an
ordinance that granted property owners a cause of action for consequential damages as a
result of street grading. The Court found a due process violation when the new ordinance
was applied retroactively to those whose property was damaged before the repeal. Id. at
150, 156. For a critique of the Court's conclusion in Etior, see Slawson, supra note 358, at
224-25.
377. Leedom v. International Bhd. of Elec. Workers Local 108, 278 F.2d 237, 240 (1960).
See Hochman, supra note 358, at 694-95; Greenblatt, supra note 358, at 554, 561 (court
should consider the reasonableness of legislative objectives and balance the asserted right
against them); Slawson, supra note 358, at 251 (court should balance factors normally associ-
ated with substantive due process, such as protection from irresponsibility of governmental
officials and protection from "punishment for choices made without knowledge of their
wrongful character"). Cf. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977) (due process requires bal-
ancing of interests to test constitutionality of assertions of judicial jurisdiction).
378. Hochman, supra note 358, at 697.
[Vol. 31THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
ABORIGINAL TITLE
rights based on aboriginal title is beyond the scope of this Article. Brief
attention, however, must be given to two signficant factors. First,
courts must be cautious in labeling legislation that retroactively extin-
guishes aboriginal rights as "curative." A curative statute is one
designed retroactively to cure defects in an administrative system or to
ratify prior official conduct of government officers who acted beyond
their authority.379 Thus, curative legislation is designed to restore what
was believed to have been the status quo. In determining whether or
not a statute is curative the courts should consider not only the rights of
private land owners, but the effects the legislation may have on the
tribe. The significant detrimental effects on the tribe, if the statute is
held valid, distinguish legislation retroactively extinguishing aboriginal
rights from all other legitimate retroactive legislation. Second, courts
should examine carefully legislation that effectively eliminates all lia-
bility.380 For example, legislation foreclosing tribal claims against the
government for breach of its fiduciary duties should be scrutinized
closely.
One final point deserves consideration. A due process analysis of
legislation affecting Indian rights may require heightened judicial scru-
tiny. Several recent decisions have required more than minimal scru-
tiny of congressional actions affecting Indian tribes on the basis of a
trust obligation between the government and the tribes. For example,
in Morton v. Mancari381 the Court sustained a statutory provision
granting Indians employment preference against attack under the due
process clause of the fifth amendment. The Court's standard required
the special treatment to be "tied rationally to the fulfillment of Con-
gress's unique obligation toward the Indians. ' 382 This same test was
employed more recently in Delaware Tribal Business Committee v.
Weeks, 383 involving the exclusion of certain Indian groups from distri-
bution of funds by Congress pursuant to an award redressing damages
caused by a breach of treaty.
379. See id. at 705; Slawson, supra note 358, at 227-28.
380. See Hochman, supra note 358 at 722-24 (discussing Perry v. United States, 294 U.S.
330 (1935), which upheld the Gold Clause Resolution as applied to private obligations but
not to obligations of the federal government). In the past, the courts have been less likely to
sustain curative legislation whose purpose is to immunize the government from liability, as
opposed to immunization of third parties. See Hochman, supra note 358, at 722-24.
381. 417 U.S. 535 (1974).
382. Id. at 555.
383. 430 U.S. 73 (1977).
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Arguably, because the Court has held that Congress owes a duty
of protection to Indians,384 this standard may be the appropriate level
of review for all congressional actions affecting tribal rights. The stan-
dard assumes that legislation affecting Indians has as its goal the fulfill-
ment of Congress's obligation to Indian tribes. Accordingly, the
standard requires that the means be tailored to achieve that end. This
heightened standard of review would temper congressional power by
requiring that Congress act consistently with its duty of protection.
Legislation retroactively extinguishing the eastern land claims surely
could not be justified if this standard of review were employed.
Conclusion
Legislation extinguishing Indian land claims, apart from the sec-
ondary issue of retroactivity, may be upheld only if the Supreme Court
adheres to the Tee-Hit-Ton rule. Recent events indicate that the Court
may be willing to reconsider Tee-Hit-Ton. In Oneida Nation,38 5 the
case opening the federal courts to the eastern land claims, the Court
quoted the "sacred as fee simple" language of Walapai Tribe,386 deem-
ing it to "succinctly summariz[e] the essence of past cases. ' 387 The
Court also relied on Walapai Tribe to reaffirm the principle that a tribal
right of occupancy is entitled to federal protection whether or not it is
based on a treaty or other formal action. 388 The Court referred to Tee-
Hit-Ton only once, in a list of citations in a footnote.38 9 In addition,
recent cases indicate that the Court may be disposed to reject argu-
ments, based on the political question and plenary power doctrines,
that the power of Congress over Indians is virtually unreviewable. 390
At a minimum, the Court may be unwilling to extend the scope of
Tee-Hit-Ton as far as the ARCO court. Notably, Tee-Hit-Ton was de-
cided during the termination era, at a time when policymakers thought
Indian reservations would soon be nonexistent.391 The termination era
is over, and federal Indian policy now favors tribal self-determina-
384. See, e.g., Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 567 (1903); United States v.
Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 384 (1886) (discussing Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515
(1832)). But f United States v. Mitchell, 100 S. Ct. 1349 (1980).
385. Oneida Indian Nation v. County of Oneida, 414 U.S. 661 (1974).
386. United States ex rel. Hualpai Indians v. Santa Fe Pac. R.R., 314 U.S. 339 (1941)
(discussed in text accompanying notes 186-89 supra).
387. 414 U.S. at 668.
388. Id. at 669.
389. Id. at 669 n.5.
390. See Delaware Tribal Business Comm. v. Weeks, 430 U.S. 73, 84 (1977) (quoting
United States v. Alcea Band of Tillamooks, 329 U.S. 40, 54 (1946)) ("power of Congress
over Indian affairs may be of a plenary nature; but it is not absolute").
391. See generally 1 AMERICAN INDIAN POLICY REVIEW COMMISSION, FINAL REPORT
[Vol. 31
tion.392 In this spirit, the Court should be willing to reexamine its hold-
ing that aboriginal title can never be a property right for purposes of
the fifth amendment taking clause.
Of course, the Court's decision to overrule Tee-Hit-Ton could sub-
ject the federal government to enormous financial liability. The Alaska
Native Claims Settlement Act was arguably consensual, so that Act's
extinguishment provisions probably would survive a challenge. The
eastern claims, however, involve large areas of land worth millions of
dollars. Yet a judgment by the Court reaffining Tee-Hit-Ton because
of fiscal considerations would not contribute to a principled resolution
of the fifth amendment issue in relation to other Indian lands. The
Court could fashion a rule to fit the eastern land claims which would
extend fifth amendment protection to all Indian land presently occu-
pied by Indian tribes and yet not subject the government to liability for
the eastern land claims. That decision could rest on reasons such as the
passage of time since the eastern tribes lost the use of their aboriginal
land and the equities of the innocent parties. A narrow application of
the Tee-Hit-Ton rule would clear the way for the Court to take a step
mandated by fairness and extend fifth amendment protection to all In-
dian land, no matter what it is called, presently occupied by an Indian
tribe. Indian tribes should not have to depend on the whim of the sov-
ereign to keep the land they have inhabited from time immemorial.
443-54 (1977); S. Tyler, A HISTORY OF INDIAN POLICY 151-88 (1973); Termination Policy,
supra note 204.
392. See S. Tyler, A HISTORY OF INDIAN POLICY 189-201 (1973).
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